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Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade'
Peter F. Coogant
It is typical of Professor Grant Gilmore that his status as chief drafts-
man of Article 9 has never deterred him from questioning whether
what was so largely his product could have been or could now be im-
proved.' Not too long ago he contemplated a meeting of those who
took part in the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 2
and who are still in the field. The invitees were to explore with one
another problems unseen or unanswered in the early drafting days: to
discuss alternative solutions to particularly persistent old problems and
to formulate tentative answers to those nonexistent or at least gen-
erally unknown during the 1940s and 1950s. Some then active in the
area have of course moved to other fields. And, as could easily have
been predicted, death has taken its toll-including the great editor-in-
chief Karl Llewellyn and Judge Herbert Goodrich, without whose com-
bined editorial and organizational talents the Code might never have
been born, as well as William Schnader, without whose generalship the
Code probably never would have been adopted, as it has been, by
all states but Louisiana.3
The title obviously is borrowed from Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-An
Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 YALE L.J. 228 (1967).
Although I am currently a member of the U.C.C. sponsor's Permanent Editorial Board,
no part of this article has been seen by or discussed with any other member of that Board;
further, I would feel free to vote against any proposal made here if other members ad-
vanced convincing arguments against it.
t Visiting Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Georgia; member of the
Massachusetts Bar.
1. Grant Gilmore and Allison Dunham were appointed co-reporters for Article 9 at an
early date; they drafted much of the original statute. Professor Dunham later became
absorbed with problems in other fields, whereas Professor Gilmore largely followed
Article 9 developments throughout the period during which he and I were consultants to
the Committee to Review Article 9. If anyone is to be singled out as the principal architect
of Article 9, it is he. And though his colleagues on the ABA-ALI Committee on Con-
tinuing Legal Education (CLE) programs during the 1960s delighted in ascribing to him
any infirmities in Article 9, in fairness it must be said that some of the problems resulted
from changes made against his advice or in his absence. Due to a temporary illness, Pro-
fessor Gilmore did not participate in the final meetings in the early 1970s of the Com-
mittee to Review Article 9.
2. ALI, NAT'L CONF. OF COMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STAT LAws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS (U.C.C.) [hereinafter cited by section number
only]. Unless reference is made to another version, this article will refer to the official
1972 text and comments.
3. Mr. Schnader, on behalf of the Commissioners, largely directed the campaign for
adoption of the U.C.C. Forty-nine states, as well as the Virgin Islands and the District of
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For reasons not related to its desirability, Grant Gilmore's planned
meeting was not held. Indeed, it may never take place. The concept
behind it, however, provides an apt thesis for an article to commemo-
rate its prospective sponsor's accomplishments. I wish to pose some of
the problems that would-or at least should-have been canvassed by
Professor Gilmore's group. More specifically, and perhaps more am-
bitiously, I wish to discuss questions that the draftsmen of the next
major revisions of Article 9 will likely have to confront. Since Article
9 was partially redrafted in 1972, I assume that it will not receive
comprehensive reconsideration for at least another ten years. What
questions might be on the agenda of the 1988 Committee to Review
Article 9, and how might they improve the present statute?4
My original aim was to explore a number of different problems
that future draftsmen might wish to consider-or to reconsider. As the
exploration progressed, however, it became increasingly apparent that
the most intriguing trouble spots now discernible derive from the
same source: Article 9's preservation of certain aspects of the old
common law notion that "possession" of property is of utmost sig-
Columbia, have adopted the Code; Louisiana, the fiftieth state, has adopted only Articles
1, 3, 4, and 5. 1 U.L.A. Uniform Commercial Code 1 (1976).
My personal appreciation of the extent to which "General" Schnader contributed to the
present near-uniformity of commercial law was heightened by my participation in the
conference held by UNIDROIT (International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law) in Rome in November, 1977. This organization, once an adjunct of the League of
Nations, has been struggling since 1926 to secure adoption of uniform legislation on various
narrow aspects of commercial law. Its secretariat is intimately familiar with like efforts by
the European Economic Community, the United Nations, and the Hague Conference on
Private International Law. Various participants expressed amazement that so large a body
of law as is represented by the U.C.C. had actually been adopted by forty-nine jurisdictions
in one generation. The absence of a need for treaties among states no doubt helped "Gen-
eral" Schnader in his efforts, but his accomplishment is nonetheless remarkable.
4. The Committee to Review Article 9, which was responsible for the 1972 revisions,
was not given free rein to improve the law. Until the U.C.C. was widely adopted, there
was an understandable aversion on the part of the sponsors to propose amendments, un-
less the former text was demonstrably wrong. By 1966, when the Committee was formed,
the U.C.C. was strong enough to withstand the criticism that a proposal for a change was
an admission that the editorial job was still unfinished. It was apparent that some im-
provements could be made. It was also apparent, however, that for an extended period
of time the old Article 9 would continue in force in a number of states while the new
Article 9 would be in force in others. Hence, the mandate of the sponsors limited the
Committee to changes suggested by rejection of a particular provision by one or more
states, by troublesome court decisions, or by criticisms in law reviews. Changes were not
to be proposed for the sake of style, and a rethinking of major policies was not encouraged
unless the prevailing text was plainly in need of change.
Anyone who knows Grant Gilmore will know that a meeting chaired by him would not
have been so limited. His invitees would have been as free as the wind to consider any
idea, regardless of its political or practical merits. My efforts here will be made in that
spirit. They will, however, focus largely on Article 9, not only because it is the Article
with which Grant Gilmore is principally associated, but also because my own U.C.C. ex-
perience is principally in the field of secured transactions.
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nificance in the field now known as secured transactions. In addition,
these intriguing problems seem likely to proliferate in the near fu-
ture. Hence, I have chosen to focus on the difficulties that attend
the remnants of the "possession" idea, for they seem the most probable
source of items for a 1988 agenda.
Happily, the result of this unpremeditated decision is an article pe-
culiarly appropriate for its honoree. Professor Gilmore's penchant for
history is well known. Indeed, Professor Gilmore, as author of the
definitive work on the history of personal property security law,5 has
laid the scholarly foundation for my present efforts. Thus the product
of Professor Gilmore's draftsmanship will be criticized here with ana-
lytic tools that he himself has fashioned. This task is a fitting tribute
to the personality of Grant Gilmore, whose eagerness to confront his
own fallibility has surely been a large element in the success of his
intellectual endeavors.
I. An Historical Preface
The idea that paramount significance attends the possession of
property is the oldest concept of chattel security law.6 Until the early
nineteenth century, the only way to create a valid security interest
in personal property was by physical pledge-the transfer of possession
of the property (collateral) by the debtor (the pledgor) to the creditor
or secured party (the pledgee).7 An attempt to transfer a security in-
terest in property that remained in the debtor's possession was con-
sidered fraudulent and invalid against third parties.8 This historic an-
tipathy to nonpossessory security interests has two aspects crucial to
my thesis. The first is the rationale for holding such interests fraudu-
lent. It was assumed that potential creditors and purchasers would
rely on a debtor's apparent ownership of assets physically in his pos-
session; this was part of the basic common law doctrine of protecting
creditors against undisclosed interests in property.9 In other words,
5. I refer, of course, to G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY (1965)
[hereinafter cited without cross reference as GILMORE]. Professor Gilmore's treatise was
written before the 1972 revisions of Article 9 but nonetheless remains the most persuasive
source of authority for the history and general approach of the Article. The reader will
be referred to later sources where pertinent.
6. Id. at 24-26, 86, 438-39.
7. Id. at 24, 40-41, 438-39.
8. Id.; see J. MfACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 255-70 (1956). The
only exception was that a pledgee could return the property to the pledgor for a "ten-
porary and limited purpose," so long as this was not in the pledgor's interest. See GIL-
MORE at 449-52.
9. This assumption was first articulated in Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star
Chamber 1601), discussed in GILMoRE at 24 n.1, 40-41; see GILMORE at 67.
1014
Vol. 87: 1012, 1978
Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Decade
it was a requirement that there be public notice of the creation of
a security interest; physical pledge, presumably, gave that public no-
tice.'0 The second important aspect was the especial hostility reserved
for a particular kind of nonpossessory security interest-the interest in
after-acquired property, particularly in the form of inventory and ac-
counts receivable." This hostility resulted less directly from the status
attributed to possession but nonetheless may be traced to that source.' 2
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there de-
veloped an increasingly pressing need for credit secured by collateral
that remained in the debtor's possession, especially after-acquired col-
lateral and especially in the form of inventory and receivables. Slowly,
debtors and creditors devised ways to overcome the obstacles posed by
the two aspects of the possession idea noted above. The history of this
struggle, manifested by a proliferation of security devices, is a fascinat-
ing story well told by Professor Gilmore; it need not be repeated
here.' 3 The outcome, on the eve of the drafting of the U.C.C., was
that nonpossessory interests could usually be successfully created; in
the process, however, "the law of personal property security transac-
tions [had come] to resemble the obscure wood in which Dante once
discovered the gates of hell."'14
Article 9 brought this "labyrinthine"' 15 melange of personal property
10. GILMORE at 40-41, 438.
11. See generally id. at 27-47, 250-86.
12. The courts were often less than clear in articulating exactly why they objected to
after-acquired property clauses, stock in trade mortgages, and early efforts to obtain
valid liens on present and future accounts receivable-all predecessors to modern inventory
and receivables financing. What became the most formidable objection, however, was that
the debtor retained "complete power and dominion" over the collateral. That this con-
cept is almost identical to the fraud idea, or "doctrine of reputed or ostensible ownership,"
that underlay the pledge is clear despite Justice Brandeis's explicit disavowal of this rela-
tion in the case that represents the height of judicial antipathy to after-acquired in-
terests in accounts receivable. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 362-63 (1925). Although
courts did not "apply directly to [accounts receivable] the doctrines of fraudulent reten-
tion of possession and of ostensible ownership" because generally "a creditor has no basis
for assuming that a debtor's intangible assets are unencumbered," they nonetheless at-
tempted to protect creditors "to some extent by adapting the basic ideas behind ostensible
ownership to the case of choses in action. The most important development of this sort
is known as the doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner." J. AlACLACHLAN, supra note 8, at 266
(footnotes omitted). Another source of judicial dislike was the principle that one cannot
transfer that which one does not yet own, as modified by its derivative theory of "potential
possession." In addition, some courts required that a secured party "perform some Baconian
Inew act' to 'perfect his title' or 'ratify the [after-acquired property interest]' "; this meant
taking possession of the property, unless one of the early statutes providing for filing was
in effect. GILMORE at 33, 31. The courts' attitude and the rationale for it, which are much
more complex than my brief summary indicates, are well analyzed in id. at 27-47, 250-86.
13. See generally GILMoRE at 5-290.
14. Id. at 27; see id. at 288-90.
15. The apt adjective is from J. MfACLACHLAN, supra note 8, at 257 (discussing states'
doctrines of fraudulent retention of possession).
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security law under one roof.16 It legitimized the status of nonpossessory
interests and provided a workable mechanism-filing in a public of-
fice-for satisfying the requirement that potential creditors be put on
notice that certain assets of the debtor might be subject to claims by
others.' 7 The draftsmen, however, did not abandon established doc-
trine; indeed, they accepted "without question" the distinction be-
tween possessory and nonpossessory security interests.', Article 9 re-
tains a category of exclusively possessory security interests: certain types
of collateral must be pledged, essentially in the old fashion. It likewise
designates a category of exclusively nonpossessory security interests:
for certain types of collateral, one cannot use the pledge. For most
types of collateral, however, either method is permissible.' 9 On its
face, then, Article 9 only slightly reduces the role of possession. But
commercial developments in the years since its drafting suggest that
its nonpossessory interests are of major importance and that its reten-
tion of exclusively possessory interests is of questionable utility and,
indeed, sometimes proves to be little more than a stumbling block.
Article 9 rejected in toto the old notion that nonpossessory interests
in after-acquired property are suspect. It dramatically expanded the
parties' freedom to create security interests in all kinds of after-ac-
quired collateral, regardless of the ultimate nature of the collateral.
20
The best-known example, and perhaps the most widely used financing
device under Article 9, is the security interest in present and future
inventory and accounts receivable. This is the so-called "floating lien,"
which secures a debt that may change in size and covers collateral
that is amorphous and likewise changeable. 2' The floating lien has
16. Article 9 applies to almost all transactions intended to create security interests in
personal property or fixtures, as well as to most sales of accounts and chattel paper (often
functionally equivalent to transfers for security). Section 9-102. Section 9-104 excludes cer-
tain transactions that might otherwise come within Article 9; these generally consist of
transactions subject to overriding federal statutes or to special social legislation of the
enacting state and transactions that are outside the normal range of commercial financing.
The drafting history and intended scope of Article 9 are set out in GILMORE at 288-316.
17. GiLMORE at 462-66. As Professor Gilmore points out, the filing system was not a
new idea; most of the pre-Code statutes that had legitimized various nonpossessory security
devices had required filing of some sort. Id. at 462-63, 466-80.
18. Id. at 290.
19. See pp. 1031-32 & notes 71-80 infra (explaining in somewhat greater detail Article
9's approach to filing and pledge and noting exceptions to general rule).
20. GILMoRE at 357. The basic provision is § 9-204(1), which states that "any or all
obligations covered by the security agreement [may] be secured by after-acquired collat-
eral." Section 9-204(2) adds a limitation for consumer goods given as additional security.
Other sections implement this basic provision by explicitly negating obvious pre-Code
obstacles. See, e.g., §§ 9-202 (making "title" to collateral irrelevant), 9-205 (repealing Bene-
dict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), see note 12 supra). For an explanation of the Code's
approach, see GILMORE at 354-66.
21. The Code does not use the term "floating lien," but this colorful term has long
been applied to the Article 9 security interest in after-acquired property. See 1 P.
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two characteristics that are important here: it is inherently nonpos-
sessory, and the collateral to which it is "attached" is "fluid" or inter-
changeable.2 2 Part II of this article will focus on these two aspects of
the floating lien, in the context of bankruptcy law. The current Bank-
ruptcy Act has been the most serious challenge to the validity of
Article 9's nonpossessory security interest in after-acquired collateral.
The proposed new Bankruptcy Act would codify for the first time two
lines of case-law development in a manner that would legitimize not
only the floating lien but also its underlying concept of interchange-
able collateral. The remarkable success of the floating lien demon-
strates a reversal of old attitudes and suggests that the significance
of a secured party's right to demand "possession" of particular items
of collateral is, if not already dead, well on its way to the grave.
Part III then turns to the basic issue of the old pledge itself, par-
ticularly its public notice aspect. Article 9 preserved this aspect 6f
"possession." The section that validates security interests despite the
debtor's retention of possession is expressly limited to nonpossessory
security interests,2 3 and the official comment emphasizes that "[t]he
common law rules on the degree and extent of possession which are
necessary to perfect a pledge interest . .. are not relaxed by this or
any other section of this Article. 24 The items of collateral that Article
9 designates as exclusively "pledgeable" have been central figures in
recent developments in commercial practices. These developments
concretize the implications of the proposed new Bankruptcy Act, with
COOGAN, IV. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 7.12(2), .12(5) (1963 & Supp. X 1977) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as
COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTs]; GILMORE at 359-65. The floating lien would not be feasible in
the absence of a notice filing system such as that of Article 9. See note 22 infra.
22. The utility of the floating lien inheres in its nonpossessory nature and in the lack
of restrictions on the types of collateral it may cover. For example, a manufacturer may
convert raw materials into finished inventory, then sell the inventory to produce cash,
chattel paper, or accounts. An Article 9 security interest in the raw materials may "flow"
through the finished inventory into its proceeds and follow through as the proceeds are
reinvested in new raw materials; the parties may repeat the cycle again and again, without
executing any documents other than a properly drawn security agreement and a properly
filed financing statement. For discussion of the floating lien and the filing system that
facilitates it, see GILMORE at 359-65, 462-80.
It is true that some aspects of a floating lien could be preserved through a series of
possessory security transactions; the ability to follow proceeds would not be too different
from the ability to do so with respect to nonpossessory interests, for § 9-312(7), added in
1972, would allow a limited back-dating of priorities for future advances. By and large,
however, each possessory security interest stands on its own feet. In the absence of a non-
possessory security interest and a nonpossessory method of "perfection" (e.g., filing), an
after-acquired property clause, for example, would be nugatory unless the debtor made
the physical transfer after obtaining rights in the collateral.
23. Section 9-205 (providing that "[t[his section does not relax the requirements of
possession where perfection of a security interest depends upon possession of the collateral
by the secured party or by a bailee").
24. Id., Comment 6.
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its acceptance of the floating lien idea of interchangeable collateral:
they suggest that "possession" may no longer be a particularly useful
concept and may soon become as much an obstacle as nonpossession
was in 1900. Article 9's present structure cannot completely accom-
modate this change. Part III explicates the problem and offers some
suggestions for the draftsmen who will have to adjust Article 9 to the
changing commercial world.
II. Article 9 Security Interests and the Proposed
New Bankruptcy Act
When a debtor enters or is thrown into bankruptcy, the secured
creditor faces two distinct threats. The first is that his claim may
not be recognized as a secured claim valid against the trustee in bank-
ruptcy and entitled to priority over unsecured claims; this is a direct
threat to the existence of his rights as a secured creditor. If his claim
survives as a valid security interest, there is the further threat that
the secured party will not be allowed to enforce his rights in the
manner and at the time provided in his security agreement with the
debtor. Restrictions on enforcement come in two forms: the tem-
porary stay of proceedings against the debtor and the permanent al-
teration of the secured party's rights. The risk of permanent alteration
is greatest in reorganization proceedings, as opposed to liquidation
(or straight bankruptcy), for the goal of reorganization is to preserve
the bankrupt business as a going concern. This may require that the
secured party be compensated in a manner other than through his
contractual "right" to obtain possession of his collateral.
In 1970 Congress authorized the creation of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States.25 The Commission's 1972 re-
port26 furnished the basis for a number of bills in both Houses; the
bill passed by the House of Representatives, H.R. 8200, has received
the most attention and will serve as the focus for analysis here. -2 7 H.R.
25. S.J. Res. No. 88, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
26. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATrS,
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 (1973).
27. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 6838 (daily ed. July 11, 1977) [here-
inafter cited by section number only]. The House of Representatives passed H.R. 8200 on
Feb. 1, 1978. See 124 CONG. REC. H478 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978). The latest Senate counter-
part is S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S18244 (daily ed. Oct. 31, 1977). It
differs materially on some provisions but corresponds to H.R. 8200 on most of the points
that concern us here, although it generally departs less from present bankruptcy concepts
than does H.R. 8200. The fate of these bills is highly uncertain, primarily because of
the controversial issue of whether the new bankruptcy courts will be created under Article
I or Article III of the Constitution. In all probability, however, a new Bankruptcy Act
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8200 would update the text of the current Bankruptcy Act; most of
its provisions are well supported by case precedent, although the cases
have not always been free from ambiguity. Hence, the bill may be
viewed to some extent as an expression of the response of federal
bankruptcy law to changes in the commercial environment. The con-
tent of that response may likewise be viewed as an indication of the
concepts or principles to which the commercial world attaches im-
portance. Significantly, the policies embodied in H.R. 8200 with re-
spect to the validity of security interests reflect a dramatic reversal
of the old bias against nonpossessory security interests in changeable
collateral. The new provisions that would "temporarily" limit en-
forcement of secured claims reflect a similar reversal, though they are
less separable from considerations peculiar to bankruptcy law. For
present purposes, the significance of H.R. 8200 is that it illustrates
the changing nature of collateral-from "property rights" in specific
items that a secured party can "possess" and sell to something more
like a prior claim against a debtor's fungible assets. The implications
of these new provisions provide a valuable historical and conceptual
backdrop for appreciating the problems discussed in Part III.
A. Validity of the Security Interest: A New
Preference for the Floating Lien
Before and shortly after the U.C.C. came into effect, predictions
were freely made that its most suspicious nonpossessory security in-
terest, the floating lien on inventory and accounts receivable, would
succumb to section 60 of the current Bankruptcy Act.2 8 Section 60
empowers the trustee in bankruptcy to nullify certain transfers by the
debtor, including transfers for security, as "voidable preferences. ' 2 9
will be in effect well before our mythical 1988 draftsmen begin their task. It seems un-
likely that major changes will be made in the provisions that I wish to discuss here,
regardless of whether the supporters of H.R. 8200 ultimately succeed in their quest for
Article III tenure and status for the bankruptcy judges.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970). Any security interest that falls within the proscription of § 60
can be invalidated by the trustee, see note 29 infra; nor is that section the limit of the
trustee's powers. See Bankruptcy Act § 67, II U.S.C. § 107 (1970) (power to invalidate cer-
tain liens and fraudulent transfers); id. § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970) ("strong-arm"
clause giving trustee rights and powers of hypothetical lien creditor); id. § 70(e), 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(e) (1970) (power to invalidate transfers "fraudulent" or "voidable" against any
other creditor of bankrupt).
I focus on the floating lien not only because of the old hostility against such security
interests, but also because its supposed conflict with § 60 has been a center of vociferous
controversy. See I COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS § 9.03 (discussing trustee's powers to invalidate
security interests); notes 29 & 37 in fra (citing literature).
29. A "voidable preference" is defined as
a transfer... of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for
or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent
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The idea is to prevent creditors from snatching additional collateral
(or payment) during the period immediately preceding bankruptcy
(the "preference period"), thereby depleting the estate and obtaining
more than their fair share of the assets of the failing business. An
early case, In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co.,30 seemed to
bear out the predictions; in the Bankruptcy Court, Referee Snedecor
read the Bankruptcy Act literally and found a legal preference where
no economic preference, or depletion of the estate, was apparent.31
The district court reversed.3 2 When the case, then dubbed DuBay
v. Williams, reached the Ninth Circuit, the district court's holding
was affirmed: although some, possibly all, of the accounts covered by
the floating lien had come into existence during the preference period,
and within four months before the filing by or against him of the [bankruptcy] peti-
tion . . . the effect of which . . . will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor . . . has, at the
time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent.
Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(1), (b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1), (b) (1970) (emphasis added). Such a
preferential transfer "enables a creditor to receive payment of a greater percentage of his
claim against the debtor than he would have received if the transfer had not been made
and he had participated in the distribution of the assets of the bankrupt estate." House
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REvISION, H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 177 (1977) (to accompany H.R. 8200) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. Further
justifications for the trustee's "avoiding powers" under § 60 are to deter the "race of
diligence" by creditors who suspect that a debtor will file a bankruptcy petition and
hence to further the policy of equality of distribution among creditors of a bankrupt
debtor. See HoUsE REPORT, supra at 177-78; King, Voidable Preferences and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 925 (1967).
The threat to an Article 9 floating lien should be apparent. Consider, for example, a
secured party (SP) whose collateral consists of accounts and whose debtor (D) has filed a
petition in bankruptcy. In a well-managed business, almost every account will have come
into existence within four months of the filing of the petition. Assume that SP has made
his advance and created his security interest much more than four months earlier. There
is thus an antecedent debt, but cf. note 35 infra (noting ambiguity of antecedent debt
question in light of § 9-108). If SP is intelligent enough to have followed D's affairs, he
will probably have had reasonable cause to believe that D was insolvent at the time the
accounts came into existence. Depending on when the trustee considers the "transfer"
to have occurred, he might attempt to invalidate SP's secured claim as a voidable pref-
erence. For a good discussion of the problem, see Skilton, Security Interests in After-
Acquired Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 925. For ex-
amples of early predictions that the trustee would succeed in such an endeavor, see
Gordon, The Security Interest in Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Preference Problem, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 57 (1962); Kennedy, The Trustee
in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems Suggested by
Articles 2 and 9, 14 RurcEPs L. REv. 518, 539-44 (1960); Riemer, Bankruptcy-Preference-
Conflict between Section 9-108 of Uniform Commercial Code and Section 60(a) of Bank-
ruptcy Act, 70 Cot. L.J. 63, 66 (1965).
30. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 194 (1966), rev'd in relevant part, 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore.
1967), aff'd sub nom. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
31. 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 212-15.
32. 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967), aff'd sub nom. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277
(9th Cir. 1969).
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their "transfer," said the Ninth Circuit, had occurred long before,
when the secured creditor had filed his financing statement.33
At face value, the reasoning of DuBay is faulty, for filing alone
does not perfect a security interest under the Code.34 In addition,
the language of the opinion was not limited to accounts and inven-
tory, and the Code is ambiguous on whether early filing should in-
sulate other kinds of after-acquired collateral from attack as pref-
erences.35 Nevertheless, DuBay, along with the similar Seventh Circuit
case, Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Savings Co.,36 seemed to have
settled the preference issue in the courts at least with respect to
inventory and receivables, although academic controversy has con-
tinued.3
7
Before Portland Newspaper had become DuBay, this writer and
others had persuaded the National Bankruptcy Conference that the
existing U.C.C. and bankruptcy law provisions could not provide a
logical answer to a U.C.C. problem not foreseen by the draftsmen
of section 60. A new committee, with Grant Gilmore as Chairman,
was appointed to determine what the law ought to be. New drafts
33. 417 F.2d 1277, 1289 (9th Cir. 1969). The Bankruptcy Act provides that the
"transfer" occurs when the security interest becomes "so far perfected that no subsequent
lien upon [the collateral] ... could become superior to the rights of the transferee." Bank-
ruptcy Act § 60(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970). Often this means filing. But cf. pp. 1031-
32 & notes 71-80 infra (explaining "perfection" under Article 9); note 41 infra (discussing
problems in interpreting this test with respect to floating lien).
34. The security interest must also "attach" under § 9-203(a). See pp. 1031-32 & notes
71-75 infra.
35. The ambiguity is found in § 9-108, which provides that after-acquired collateral is,
generally, not to be deemed security for "antecedent debt." Section 9-108 does not dis-
tinguish among types of collateral, but it is clearly aimed at protecting inventory and
receivables financing. The section has been attacked as a sneaky attempt to-circumvent the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. See Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bank-
ruptcy, 75 CoM. L.J. 269, 275-76 (1970). DuBay did not rely on § 9-108: "The intent of the
draftsmen to insulate [the floating lien] from preference attack is evidenced by § 9-108 ....
We do not reach the question, hotly contested by the parties, whether the Commercial
Code draftsmen were successful in thus defeating a claim of preference." 417 F.2d at 1289
n.15. Cf. Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209, 218 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969) (declining to pass on question but noting that court would be
"reluctant" to hold that provision enacted by 49 states does not fall within § 60's reference
to state law in lien creditor test for determining time of transfer). To my knowledge, no
court has ever upheld a floating lien on the basis of § 9-108 alone. If § 9-108 were part of
the Bankruptcy Act, there would of course be no question as to its validity. Section 547 of
H.R. 8200 would accomplish much of what § 9-108 attempts. See pp. 1022-24 & notes 40-41,
43-44 infra.
36. 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969).
37. See, e.g., Ashe, Federal-State Conflicts of Law Bankruptcy Act Vis-A-Vis Uniform
Commercial Code, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 29 (1974) (floating lien constitutes preference under
Bankruptcy Act § 60; Grain Merchants and DuBay incorrectly decided); Countryman, supra
note 35, at 277 (same); Krause, Kripke & Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act:
Three Views on Preferences and After-Acquired Property, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 278, 282 (1967)
(floating lien creates serious question of conflict with Bankruptcy Act).
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of section 60 were exchanged for several years, and a general consensus
emerged in 1970.88 The Gilmore Committee's proposed redraft was
recommended by the Committee to Study the Bankruptcy Laws; with
many verbal changes, that draft has survived the various versions of
the proposed new Bankruptcy Act. Although it has again been re-
worded as section 547 of H.R. 8200, the analytic structure of the
Gilmore draft remains.3
9
Proposed section 547 aims at a modus vivendi between secured and
unsecured creditors and, like all compromises, gives something to each
side. With respect to inventory and accounts receivable, it would
exorcise whatever remains of the old antipathy to the floating lien
by scrapping the current preference test and replacing it with one
that focuses exclusively on whether the secured party has improved
his position economically, to the detriment of the estate. 40 No longer
would it be even arguably relevant that particular items of collateral
had first come into the debtor's possession during the preference pe-
riod; proper filing would protect the floating lien on inventory and
accounts, subject only to the new economic preference test.41
38. For a description of the Committee's work and a statement of its ultimate con-
sensus, see National Bankruptcy Conference, Report of the Committee on Coordination of
the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial Code (1970), reprinted in HousE REPORT,
supra note 29, at 204 [hereinafter cited as Gilmore Committee Report].
39. Compare H.R. 8200 § 547 with Gilmore Committee Report, supra note 38, at 210-
19 (proposed redraft of Bankruptcy Act § 60).
40. H.R. 8200 § 547(c)(5). This subsection sets up a two-point measuring system that
compares the position of the transferee (or secured party) three months before the filing
of the bankruptcy petition with his position at the date of filing. "Intervening fluctuations
in the relationship between debt and collateral during the [three]-month period are
ignored." Gilmore Committee Report, supra note 38, at 216. For a detailed discussion of
the new "economic preference" test, see Kronman, The Treatment of Security Interests in
After-Acquired Property Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 110,
141-58 (1975).
41. The relationship to the "possession" idea is somewhat murky but not quite indirect.
Under § 9-303(1), a security interest must "attach" in order to be "perfected" against sub-
sequent lien creditors, see § 9-301(b). One of the requirements for attachment is that the
debtor have "rights in the collateral," § 9-203(1)(c). See pp. 1031-32 & notes 71-80 infra
(explaining Article 9's "perfection" rules). "Rights in" is not defined in the Code, and
the term is not equivalent to "possession," although there is a conceptual relation.
The difficulty this created under the Bankruptcy Act's "lien creditor" test for de-
termining the time of "transfer," see note 33 supra, is that, although the Code clearly
states that the security interest is not perfected until it has attached, the debtor's acquir-
ing "rights in the collateral" automatically perfects it if the requisite filing has been made
and the other attachment requirements, see § 9-203(l)(a), (b), have been fulfilled. There-
fore, no lien creditor could possibly obtain a superior claim so long as the filing remains in
effect, even though the debtor does not acquire "rights in" specific items of collateral
for months or years. This is generally what happens under a floating lien. See note 22
supra. If, under a floating lien challenged by the bankruptcy trustee, a certain account
has been created or an item of inventory has been acquired by the debtor during the
critical preference period, when did the "transfer" occur? Interestingly, the 1962 version
of § 9-204 provided that "the debtor has no rights ...in an account until it comes into
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This new advantage for the secured party, however, would not ap-
ply to other kinds of collateral. Here, in fact, the secured party would
lose ground: although the preference period would be shortened from
four months to three (a gain for the secured party),42 insolvency dur-
ing the three-month period would be presumed (a gain for the trustee
and unsecured creditors). 43 More importantly, the implication of Du-
Bay, that the "transfer" takes place not when the collateral comes
into the debtor's hands but rather years earlier when the filing was
made, would be expressly negated.44 For inventory and receivables,
existence." Section 9-204(2), (2)(d) (1962 version). Subsection (2) of § 9-204 was eliminated
entirely in 1972 "as unnecessary and in some cases confusing. Its operation appeared to
be arbitrary, and it is believed that the questions . . are best left to the courts." Section
9-204, Official Comment to 1972 Amendments ("Reasons for 1972 Change"). For discussion
of the seeming paradox, see, e.g., Countryman, supra note 35, at 275-77. Cf. Grain
Merchants v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209, 215-17 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 827 (1969) (espousing "entity" or "res" theory, which avoids problem of "transfer"
altogether (alternative holding)).
The "economic preference" test of proposed § 547 of the Bankruptcy Act would
eliminate this difficulty with respect to inventory and accounts by drastically reducing the
importance of the time of the "transfer" for purposes of the preference test. See note 40
supra. This would mean that a secured claim on inventory and accounts would always
be safe, unless the debt was undercollateralized at the time the secured party made his
last advance.
An entirely different question, which further complicates matters, is the Code's provision
for automatic perfection (for 10 days) of a security interest in proceeds of the original
collateral, § 9-306(2)-(4). The status of a secured party's claim to proceeds under both the
old and the proposed new preference sections of the Bankruptcy Act is unclear; the Gil-
more Committee took no position on the question. See Gilmore Committee Report, supra
note 38, at 217-18. See generally Countryman, supra note 35, at 271-75; Gillombardo, The
Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code Proceeds in Bankruptcy: A Proposed Redraft of
Section 9.306, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1969); Henson, "Proceeds" under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 232 (1965). For what seems to be a misconstruction of
what § 9-306(4)(d) gives to the secured party in bankruptcy, see In re Gibson Prods., 543
F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977). Gibson concluded that the
"proceeds" of which § 9-306(d)(ii) speaks are not limited to proceeds of the secured party's
collateral; the court nonetheless reached the correct result-i.e., that the secured party's
claim does not extend to nonproceeds of his collateral-by "apply[ing] Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act to resolve the problem." Id. at 656. For the opposite rationale, which
seems correct, see Fitzpatrick v. Philco Fin. Corp., 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974).
42. H.R. 8200 § 547(b)(4)(A).
43. Id. § 547(b). In its present form, § 547 would eliminate the "reasonable cause to
believe" rule as an element of a preferential transfer during the three-month preference
period. But it would allow the trustee to void preferential transfers made to "insiders"
between one year before the date of filing and the beginning of the three-month preference
period, if he could show that the transferee had reasonable cause to believe the debtor
insolvent at the time such a transfer was made. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B)(ii). This represents a
further gain for the trustee and unsecured creditors, for, under existing law, the trustee
cannot void preferential transfers made prior to the four-month preference period. Bank-
ruptcy Act § 60(a)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1970).
44. H.R. 8200 § 547(e)(2), (3). These provisions would continue the old lien creditor
test.
DuBay held that the transfer of after-acquired property subject to a security interest is
deemed to have been made at the time the original security interest was perfected. 417
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this would be irrelevant, since the economic preference test essentially
dispenses with the temporal element of "transfer." For other collateral,
however, it would clarify an ambiguity in the case law to the clear
disadvantage of secured creditors.
The historical irony in this approach is that it gives a preferred status
to the floating lien on inventory and accounts, formerly the most en-
dangered species of after-acquired property interests, and clearly de-
clines to protect other types of collateral and other types of liens in
the same manner. Although section 547 would not, for any kind of
collateral, abrogate the traditional principle of "substitution" of col-
lateral, 45 it would significantly relax the requirement with respect to
inventory and accounts. The division, of course, is not between "pos-
sessory" and "nonpossessory" interests except insofar as the floating
lien is inherently nonpossessory.46 But this merely emphasizes the ir-
relevance of the distinction and does not detract from the illustrative
value of my historical point.
F.2d at 1287-88. This reasoning "neglects the fact that under Article 9 itself, the after-
acquired property interest is not perfected until the property is acquired" and "ap-
parently . . . [would] mean that a pre-filed Article 9 security interest in after-acquired
property can never be a preference." Gilmore Committee Report, supra note 38, at 218.
Proposed § 547 of the Bankruptcy Act would negative DuBay by including the Article 9
concept that there is no perfection until the debtor has "acquired rights in the collat-
eral." Section 9-203(l)(c). Thus a security interest in property acquired by the debtor
during the three-month preference period would be treated as a transfer for antecedent
debt, voidable as a preference. If the secured party had contemporaneously given equivalent
new value, of course, he would not have obtained any preference, and his security interest
would remain a valid secured claim. See Gilmore Committee Report, supra note 38, at
218-19.
45. It has always been the case that the substitution of one set of items of collateral
for another of equivalent value does not constitute a "preference," in the same way that
the transfer of a security interest in consideration for a contemporaneous advance does
not constitute a transfer for "antecedent debt." For a brief discussion of the "substitution
of collateral doctrine," see Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209,
217-18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969).
46. "Inventory" is not exclusively "nonpledgeable" under Article 9, that is, security
interests in such collateral are not necessarily nonpossessory; one might even use the term
"floating lien" to describe a field warehousing arrangement, under which a professional
warehouseman acts as custodian of inventory, physically monitoring and controlling its
continual replenishment and depletion on behalf of the secured party. See GILMRE at
146, 146-54 (describing field warehousing operation and noting that it was considered "a
pledge, or a sort of pledge, or something that was more nearly like a pledge than it was
like anything else"). "Accounts," on the other hand, are exclusively "nonpledgeable." See
p. 1032 &- notes 76, 77 infra. In practice, of course, the floating lien is almost always
nonpossessory, that is, always perfected through filing. Except under a field warehousing
arrangement, a creditor would seldom take possession of particular items of inventory in
order to perfect his security interest, unless his intent were to bring business operations to
a halt rather than to finance them on an ongoing basis. Cf. GILMORE at 149 (noting that,
although it was always part of field warehousing "mystique . . . that filing was neither
necessary nor desirable" and that lenders usually considered themselves pledgees, financing
companies, "not much given to mysticism," almost always file anyway).
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B. Limitations on Enforcement: Nonpossession
and Interchangeable Collateral
At least since the early 1940s, secured parties should have been
aware of the possibility that they might not be allowed to enforce
their rights to take possession of and to retain or dispose of collateral
under security agreements providing for such action upon default.
The tendency to prevent secured parties from exercising their full
rights is clear in the case law47 and is further evidenced in post-Code
Bankruptcy Rules.48 H.R. 8200 would codify these restrictions in pro-
visions that would apply to both liquidations and reorganizations.
49
Section 362 of the proposed Act would essentially duplicate the
automatic stay provisions of the present Bankruptcy Rules: the filing
of a bankruptcy petition would operate to stay enforcement of most
legal actions against the debtor, including that of liens on his proper-
ty." The stay would be automatic, but the secured party could bring
about its termination or modification "for cause."51 Section 363 would
allow the trustee to sell or continue to use the secured party's collateral,
47. See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Kaplan, 185 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1950) (reposses-
sion by secured party forbidden in Chapter X bankruptcy); cf. In re Third Avenue Transit
Corp., 198 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1952) (recognizing public interest in permitting trustee in
Chapter X bankruptcy to use proceeds subject to security interest, but holding that
trustee had not met heavy burden of proof that use of these proceeds was absolutely
necessary and would not injure secured party). The possibility that a creditor "otherwise
compensated" could not enforce a lien on his original collateral was also recognized under
the predecessor to Chapter X. See Consolidated Rock Prods. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
For recent cases, see, e.g., In re Bermec, 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971) (repossession by secured
party forbidden in Chapter X bankruptcy); In re Yale Express Sys., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir.
1967) (same).
48. A series of comparatively recent bankruptcy rules makes the stay of proceedings
against a debtor automatic for both liquidation bankruptcies and reorganizations. Bank-
ruptcy Rule 601, 11 U.S.C.A. app. (West Pamphlet 1976) (liquidation bankruptcies); id.
10-601, 11 U.S.C.A. app. (West Pamphlet 1976) (Chapter X reorganizations); id. 11-44, II
U.S.C.A. app. (West Pamphlet 1976) (Chapter XI reorganizations). On the current bank-
ruptcy provisions for automatic stays, see generally 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.15[1]-
[1.5] (1977); 8 id. 4.15-.16.
49. The sections discussed in the following text, with the exception of those pertaining
to class approval of reorganization plans, would be "generally applicable" provisions. In
theory, this would probably extend the trustee's powers in liquidation proceedings. The
practical effect, however, would probably not be great. When the debtor's assets are sub-
stantial, liquidations are less common than attempts at reorganizations. Furthermore, the
trustee in a liquidation has little reason to exercise greater powers than those under the
automatic stay provisions, see note 48 supra; he would have no objection, for example, to
a secured party's repossessing and disposing of his collateral and turning over any surplus
to the trustee, unless he thought he could obtain a higher price by disposing of such
assets himself. See 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VACTs § 9.021].
50. H.R. 8200 § 362; cf. Bankruptcy Rules cited in note 48 supra (current provisions
for automatic stays).
51. H.R. 8200 § 362(d)-(g). "Cause" includes "lack of adequate protection of an interest
in property of (a] party in interest." These provisions bring into play id. § 361, which is
aimed at protecting the secured party when his rights must be altered in the interest of
allowing reorganization to proceed. See p. 1027 infra.
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subject to important qualifications. If the collateral were "soft col-
lateral"-collateral that would disappear if used, such as inventory,
cash, or accounts-the debtor could use it for only five days; after that,
he would be required to obtain court permission by showing, at a
hearing, that the secured party would not be injured by the delay.r2
If the collateral were "hard," the debtor would have much greater
freedom to use or sell, but the secured party could attempt to stop
him. 53 This section is new in that it would codify the debtor's right
to use collateral, but it is supported by precedents such as In re
Bermec,5 4 In re Yale Express Systems,5 5 and pre-Code cases such as
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Kaplan.56 Finally, section 364 sets
forth rules that would govern the debtor's use of assets to raise new
52. H.R. 8200 § 363(a), (c)(2). Proposed § 363(a) defines "soft collateral" as "inventory,
farm products, accounts, contract rights, general intangibles, cash, negotiable instruments,
documents of title, securities, or chattel paper in which the estate and an entity other
than the estate have an interest" (emphasis added). Section 363(c)(2) provides for notice
and a hearing for the secured party before soft collateral can be used for more than
five days. Debtor attorneys undoubtedly will argue that the five days is too short; secured
creditor counsel will argue that in five days inventory and cash will have disappeared.
The five days may well be changed before the section becomes law.
53. Although proposed § 363 of the Bankruptcy Act does not speak in terms of "hard
collateral," the phrase can reasonably be applied to all collateral not covered by subsection
(a), such as machinery or motor vehicles. See note 52 supra. Subsection (c)(1) concerns
such property and provides that the trustee may "enter into transactions, including the
sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business, without notice
or a hearing, and may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business with-
out notice or a hearing." Subsection (e) permits any entity that has an interest in property
proposed to be used, sold, or leased by the trustee to obtain a court hearing, at which
the "trustee has the burden of proof on the issue of adequate protection."
54. 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1971). Bernzec was a Chapter X case, involving trailers pur-
chased by the debtor on conditional sales contracts and then leased to others. The court
of appeals affirmed Bankruptcy Judge Asa Herzog's decision, No. 71-B-291 (S.D.N.Y. July
15, 1971), which had allowed the debtor to continue to use the trailers, although they
were subject to a security interest. Judge Herzog's decision relied on the trustee's willing-
ness to pay to the secured party an amount equal to the depreciation on the trailers
during their use-perhaps the first case in which permission to use collateral was tied to
payment to a secured party.
55. 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967). Yale Express was factually similar to Berinec but
differed legally in that payment to compensate for use was not required. An earlier
decision in the same case had suggested the possibility that rental payments could be
made to the secured party, 370 F.2d 433, 439 (2d Cir. 1967). But when the district court
found that Yale Express was in no position to pay, the Second Circuit nevertheless af-
firmed an authorization of the debtor's use of the collateral, this time with the weak
condition that the secured parties be made whole in the reorganization. Yale Express
gives the secured party less protection than would proposed § 361. See p. 1027 infra.
56. 185 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1950). This decision permitted the trustees of Waltham
Watch, in a Chapter X bankruptcy, to use cash subject to the secured party's lien for
the purpose of converting unfinished watch parts into saleable watches. The court rea-
soned that the secured party would not be injured by this use of cash, since the finished
watches would be worth far more than the unfinished parts. The secured party must have
thought differently, or he would not have fought such a long battle in the courts. Kaplan
relied on an earlier railroad reorganization case, Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935). 185 F.2d at 795-97.
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money, under which a secured party might find that a new lender
shared his security or even came ahead of him.
5 7
All these sections would be subject to the "adequate protection"
standards of proposed section 361. The court would have to protect
the secured party by requiring periodic payments to compensate for
any decrease in value of collateral that remained beyond the reach
of the secured creditor;58 by giving the secured party different or ad-
ditional collateral to replace that for which he had contracted;5 9 or
by transforming his secured claim into an administrative claim en-
titled to priority under proposed section 503(b)(1), provided that the
court found as well that the estate would have assets to make this
priority meaningful. 60 The court might also approve other methods
to compensate for loss.01 On paper, these protections look good for
the secured party. But debtors are often unable to make periodic
cash payments; just as frequently, they can furnish no additional or
substitute collateral. In such cases, the secured party would have to
rely on the bankruptcy judge's ability to predict accurately whether
the estate would have sufficient assets to pay administrative expenses.
The judge's guess might well prove wrong, especially if made early
in the proceedings, when the guesses are often long ones.
Significantly, these proposed bankruptcy sections purport to pro-
tect the secured party not through his interest in his specific collateral,
but rather through some form of compensation that may involve other
collateral or other assurances; they use and expand the U.C.C. con-
cept of "substitutability" of collateral. This feature is carried even
further in the provisions of H.R. 8200 that would allow courts to
approve reorganization plans without the consent of one or more classes
of creditors. Class acceptance of a plan would be excused if the class
claims were "unimpaired." 62 Reinstatement of an original maturity
date generally would not be an impairment;6 3 moreover, class claims
would be unimpaired if the plan gave the class cash or other "proper-
ty" (excluding securities of the debtor) equal to the "value" of each
57. H.R. 8200 § 364(a) would allow the trustee to "obtain unsecured credit and incur
unsecured debt in the ordinary course of business allowable under § 503(b)(1) of this
title as an administrative expense." If such credit were not allowable as an administra-
tive expense, subsection (c) would permit the trustee, after notice and a hearing, to obtain
credit with priority over all administrative expenses or secured by a junior lien on
property already subject to a lien.
58. Id. § 361(l).
59. Id. § 361(2).
60. Id. § 361(3).
61. Id. § 361(4).
62. Id. § 1129(a)(8)(B).
63. Id. § 1124(2)(B).
1027
The Yale Law Journal
creditor's claim.64 Even if class claims were impaired, and the class
had not given its approval, the court could nonetheless confirm the
plan provided that no secured creditor would receive more than the
value of his claim and that each secured creditor would receive
property (here not excluding securities of the debtor) equal to the
allowed value of his claim. 5 Hence a secured party might have to
be satisfied with an entirely new claim or collateral for which he never
contracted, despite rejection of the substitution by him or his class
as a whole.
These restrictions on the rights of secured creditors may raise con-
stitutional issues that far exceed the scope of this article.13 The signif-
icant point here is that they depend on the same conceptual device as
does the floating lien-that collateral can be amorphous and changeable
without losing its character as collateral. If, in a reorganization, a se-
cured party winds up with something different from the collateral to
which his original lien was attached, the substitution will not be cause
for legal concern. This contrasts starkly with the old notion that a
secured party can, upon default by his debtor, repossess his collateral
and "make himself whole" to the extent the collateral is worth the
amount of the debt. In such a framework, what happens to the debtor
and his other creditors is a matter of indifference to the secured
party. But judicial and regulatory developments have long suggested
that this is no longer the case, and H.R. 8200 would continue the
trend.
Significantly, H.R. 8200, in perhaps its most basic provision, pays
little attention to who has possession of property in which the bankrupt
(or the debtor in reorganization) has an interest: the estate, under
proposed section 541(a)(1), would include "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
64. Id. § 1129(b)(l)(B)(iii).
65. Id. § l129(b)(2)(A). Neither "property" nor "value" is defined in the proposed Act.
66. The trustee- has considerable powers, which are probably constitutional, under the
current Bankruptcy Act and Rules and judicial interpretations of the so-called "crain-
down" provisions that permit approval of plans that creditors reject. See generally 6
COLLIER ON BANKRUPrCY f f, .10, 3.23-.34, 7.37-.47, 9.21 (1977); 6A id. Ej1 10.03, 10.14, 10.17;
9 id. 9.15-.21.
H.R. 8200 would extend these powers; whether they could amount to a "taking" under
the Fifth Amendment may well become a matter of some debate. For a discussion of
these issues in the context of an earlier version of the proposed reorganization provisions,
which were considerably less protective of secured parties' rights, see Coogan, Broude &
Glatt, Comments on Some Reorganization Provisions of the Pending Bankruptcy Bills, 30
Bus. LAW. 1149 (1975). The issue is hardly new; in Consolidated Rock Prods. v. DuBois,
312 U.S. 510 (1941), for example, Justice Douglas held that a secured party has no con-
stitutional right to continue an interest in his specific collateral so long as he is "ade-
quately compensated .... [I]t is not material out of what assets [ime] is paid . Id. at
530.
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case," with certain exceptions not relevant here. Proposed section 543
(b)(1) would require any custodian possessing such property to turn
it over to the debtor or trustee. And, under proposed section 542(a),
any other person possessing property that the trustee could use or sell
under proposed section 363 would likewise have to surrender posses-
sion. Thus a creditor who obtained possession prior to the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy proceedings would often have no advantage
over a creditor who did not take possession. These provisions repre-
sent a break even with the current bankruptcy law, under which "the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy [court] is limited by the concept of
possession, either actual or constructive.1
67
This is not to say that H.R. 8200 generally distinguishes between
possessory and nonpossessory interests as such. But in at least one
crucial area-the preference provisions-it protects interests likely to
be nonpossessory well beyond the point at which it refuses to protect
interests more likely to be possessory. The reorganization provisions,
with their broad endorsement of "interchangeable" collateral, depart
even more from tradition. The "lien" on specific "property" has be-
come, in essence, a claim to priority--a far cry from the mortgage on
Blackacre and the closely related concept that possession of a particular
item of property or collateral is of overriding legal importance.
6 8
What is of overriding importance, both in the preference provisions
of proposed section 547 and in the sections that would limit enforce-
ment, is business necessity, in the form of an increased need for credit.
The wail of the bankruptcy referee in Portland Newspaper is illustra-
tive: in the good old days, a business enterprise was financed primarily
by its owner, and, in time of trouble, its assets were available for dis-
tribution to unsecured creditors; now, businesses rely on credit far
more heavily, and the increase takes the form of secured credit, at
67. HousE REPORT, supra note 29, at 43 (footnotes omitted). This is not true of Chapter
X cases. Id. at 43 n.304. For a taste of the voluminous literature on what constitutes
"possession" by the debtor, see sources cited in id. at 43 nn.304, 305, 307 & 309. A
particularly good treatment of the issue is Note, Scope of the Summary Jurisdiction of
the Bankruptcy Court, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1940). The reasons for expanding the
jurisdiction are set out in I REPORT OF THE COMMIssION TO STUDY THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 26, at 88-92.
68. The floating lien of Article 9, though it covers constantly changing items of
collateral, is nonetheless tied to the type or types of collateral described in the security
agreement. The description in the security agreement, however, is "sufficient whether or
not it is specific if it reasonably identifies" the collateral. Section 9-110. This section frees
the parties of the common pre-Code requirements for excessively detailed descriptions of
collateral (the "serial number" test), see Comment to id., and makes the true floating lien
feasible. Cf. Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209, 215-17 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969) (espousing "entity theory" of Article 9 floating lien,
which, although it "floats" over constantly changing specific items, is firmly attached to
a iery definite bundle of collateral).
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least to a large extent.69 Quite often this means credit secured by
the floating lien on inventory and accounts, hence the recognition
that such security interests must be protected against wholesale invali-
dation as voidable preferences. The limitations on enforcement are
tied more to a different practical consideration recognized by debtors
and creditors alike: the sacrifices that result when liquidation values
are substituted for going concern values dictate compromises by all
during efforts to salvage a debt-ridden business through reorganization.
Both these responses to commercial need-the preference provisions
and the limitations on enforcement-have little in common with the
importance formerly attached to collateral that a secured party "pos-
sesses" or even collateral of a nature specific enough that it could be
"possessed." Rather, they embrace the diametrically opposed concept
of interchangeable collateral.70 This development is quite significant,
for Article 9 itself now faces problems stemming from further com-
mercial developments, and it appears that the best solution will have
something in common with the bankruptcy response: a move away
from the old notion of "possession." With H.R. 8200, the tendency is
away from the old bias against nonpossessory security interests, espe-
cially in "fluid" collateral. Article 9 has, of course, already taken that
step. For Article 9, the move now required is one away from the more
basic aspect of "possession," the public notice aspect, which Article 9
accepted and perpetuated.
III. Possession and Public Notice: The Challenge for Article 9
The decreasing importance of the concept of possession is even
clearer outside the bankruptcy area. One of the most striking de-
velopments in commercial practices in recent years has been the ef-
fort to eliminate in a variety of contexts the need for "paper" evidences
of interests or claims. The trend creates severe problems for Article
69. 3 U.C.C. Rep. at 214:
The old-fashioned method of operating a business on the strength of equity capital
and unsecured bank credit based upon the financial integrity of the debtor seems to
be giving away to the modern trend of financing business operations in reliance upon
a floating lien on current assets with little or no regard for equity capital .... These
methods leave the daily suppliers and employees in a perilous position.
I know of no studies that confirm Referee Snedecor's comments in Portland Newspaper,
but most businessmen would find it hard to disagree.
70. The floating lien, of course, covers "interchangeable" collateral only to a certain
degree. See note 68 supra; ef. § 9-306(2)-(4) (automatic transfer of security interest in
collateral covered by security agreement to proceeds of that collateral). The enforcement
limitations of H.R. 8200 are even broader; instead of a lien that "floats" over changing
items of collateral, they contemplate a lien that drifts away completely from the collateral
to which it was moored by the security agreement. This would be tempered somewhat in
liquidation, as opposed to reorganization, proceedings; in liquidation, the liens might
often be allowed to find their moorings. See note 49 supra.
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9, for the representative piece of paper usually falls within the category
of exclusively pledgeable collateral, and the consequence of eliminat-
ing it is that the collateral becomes exclusively nonpledgeable. And
then one must file to perfect one's security interest, an alternative that
would appear, at first blush, to be unsatisfactory for a number of rea-
sons-although, as I will suggest, we may have to change some notions
here.
Before exploring the problems that this creates, one must grasp the
essence of the Article 9 approach to "perfection." This requires, in
the first instance, an unraveling of the awkward semantics of section
9-303. The first two sentences of section 9-303(1) state that "perfec-
tion" consists of all of the steps specified in section 9-203(1) to cause
a security interest to "attach," 71 plus one or more of the steps spe-
cified in sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, and 9-306 as necessary to "per-
fect." 72 Section 9-303(2) uses the term "perfect" to cover both these
requirements; this is the proper and only sensible meaning of "per-
fection." But the last clause of the first sentence of section 9-303(1)
is less artistically phrased;7 3 moreover, sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305, and
9-306, which specify when certain steps such as filing are required
for "perfection," do not even mention the co-requirement of attach-
ment. The language, although not incorrect, is certainly inartistic and
has led to the use of "perfection" to refer to the steps required by the
enumerated sections of Part 3 of Article 9 alone, even though satis-
faction of those steps does not create a perfected security interest un-
less the attachment requirements of section 9-203(1) have also been
met.74 "Perfection" was used to describe the effect of complying with
71. Under § 9-203(1), a security interest "does not attach unless (a) the collateral is in
the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a
security agreement which contains a description of the collateral . . .; and (b) value has
been given; and (c) the debtor has rights in the collateral."
72. These sections deal with U.C.C. filing, see generally § 9-302; federal or state filing
and notation on certificates of title, see § 9-302(3), (4); transfer of possession of the
collateral, § 9-305; and permanent or temporary excuse from these requirements, §§ 9-302
(1)(d) (filing not required for purchase money security interest in consumer goods); 9-304
(4), (5), 9-306(2), (3) (temporary excuse from filing with respect to instruments, docu-
ments, and proceeds in certain circumstances).
73. The entire sentence reads as follows (emphasis added): "[a] security interest is
perfected when it has attached and when all of the applicable steps required for perfec.
tion hate been taken." Section 9-303(1) (emphasis added). The next sentence adds that
"[s]uch steps are specified in Sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305 and 9-306."
74. At least two distinguished courts of appeals seem not to have understood this. See
DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants v. Union Bank &
Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969). In each case, the court
stated that after a U.C.C. financing statement had been filed, no unsecured creditor could
have obtained a superior lien by legal process. This is simply not true. See notes 34 & 73
supra. In each case, however, there had in fact been more than a filing (i.e., the attach-
ment requirements of § 9-203(1) had been met), so perhaps the opinions were imprecise
rather than truly inaccurate.
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the specified sections of Part 3 simply for lack of a ready phrase to
describe their real purposes: to specify when public notice of the crea-
tion of a security interest is requirdd and to set out (indirectly) an
appropriate method of giving that public notice.
7 5
Public notice is required to perfect virtually all security interests
under Article 9. The requirement can be satisfied in one of two basic
ways. "Notice filing" in a public office-a central Article 9 concept
and in most respects a significant improvement over pre-Code systems
-is a permissible means of notice for security interests in most types
of collateral;76 it is the only permissible method for "accounts" and
"general intangibles." 77 Article 9 also recognizes the old-fashioned
pledge as a public notice mechanism; filing, with the two exceptions
noted above, is excused when the collateral is in the possession of the
secured party.78 The pledge is the exclusive method of notice for
"instruments" and money.70 The upshot is that one must file as to
accounts and general intangibles; one must take possession of instru-
ments and money; and one may do either in most other cases.80
75. The text of Article 9 does not, unfortunately, specifically articulate the "public
notice" requirement. Professor Homer Kripke, in the early days of Article 9, once casually
mentioned the desirability of a phrase such as "giving (or excusing) public notice," but
neither he nor I followed this up at a time when it could easily have been done. Logically,
of course, this underlying rationale is obvious; otherwise, the sponsors might as well have
required secured parties to stand on their heads or look toward Mecca or perform some
other ritual in order to perfect their security interests. In any event, the rationale is clear
from the official comments. See, e.g., § 9-302, Comment 1. And, of course, history makes
the rationale crystal clear. See GILMoRE at 438-39, 462-64.
76. The general provision is § 9-302, which is phrased in terms of when filing is not
required. The various exceptions are briefly summarized in note 72 supra. Numerically,
filing (under the U.C.C. or some other system) is probably the most important method of
public notice; notation on automobile title certificates would probably be next.
77. By virtue of omission from § 9-305 ("When Possession by Secured Party Perfects
Security Interest Without Filing") and from the other exceptions to § 9-302, filing is
required to perfect security interests in accounts and general intangibles. But cf. § 9-306
(2), (3) (temporary automatic perfection of security interest in proceeds).
78. Section 9-302(l)(a) (filing not required when collateral is in possession of secured
party under § 9-305); § 9-305 (possession by secured party perfects security interest in
letters of credit, advices of credit, goods, instruments, money, negotiable documents, or
chattel paper).
79. Section 9-304(l). This too must be qualified in light of §§ 9-304(4), (5) (temporary
automatic perfection of security interests in instruments, negotiable documents, and goods
in possession of bailee), 9-306(2), (3) (temporary automatic perfection of security interest
in proceeds). If an instrument forms a part of chattel paper, perfection as to the whole
(i.e., as to the chattel paper along with its accompanying instrument) may be by filing.
Sections 9-105(l)(b), 9-304(1).
80. The overgeneralization in the text must be read in light of the exceptions and
qualifications listed in notes 72 & 76-79 supra. The most significant exception, in terms
of sheer numbers, is the provision for notation on vehicles' certificates of title, § 9-302
(3)(c), (4). Such security interests are so common that this mechanism might even be
considered a third "basic way" of satisfying Article 9's public notice requirement. In addi-
tion, it bears repetition to emphasize that neither filing nor taking possession alone suf-
fices to "perfect": the security interest must also attach under § 9-203(1).
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This oversimplified description should serve to introduce some
questions that the 1988 Committee to Review Article 9 would do
well to answer. The sections that follow query the continuing validity
of the underlying assumptions of the pledge, expose some problems
that confront the Article 9 scheme as "paperless" transactions become
more common and more desirable, and speculate on what alternative
methods of public notice might better serve the modern commercial
world.
A. Does the Pledge Really Give Public Notice?
The assumption behind the pledge is that, if a debtor retains pos-
session of property he does not own "free and clear," he may use these
apparently unencumbered assets to deceive potential creditors or pur-
chasers. Hence, if such fraud is to be prevented, encumbered assets
must be removed from the debtor's control."' Article 9 implements
the pledge through three basic provisions. Section 9-302(l)(a) excuses
filing, and no other form of public notice is required. -Section
9-203(l)(a) excuses the requirement of a writing signed by the debtor
that describes the collateral when "the collateral is in the possession of
the secured party pursuant to agreement." Thus the transfer of posses-
sion satisfies the statute of frauds provision as well as the public notice
requirement. Finally, section 9-305 deems a secured party to be in
possession if any bailee has possession and is notified of the secured
party's interest in the collateral.8 2 The text does not require that the
bailee in any way act for the secured party, but the official comment
contemplates that the bailee will function as the secured party's "agent,"
or at least be free of the debtor's control. It then adds that the bailee
need not transfer the property to the secured party or even acknowledge
that he now holds the property on the secured party's behalf.
83
The 1988 Committee to Review Article 9 should thoroughly re-
consider each aspect of this mode of "perfection" through possession.
Its most fundamental function-providing public notice-seems of ques-
tionable utility, even if the secured party himself takes possession.
Without possession, of course, the debtor could not obtain false credit
through another physical pledge, nor could he deceive a potential
creditor into relying on his possession and apparent ownership of the
81. See pp. 1014-15 and notes 8 & 12 supra.
82. The secured party's "possession" dates from the time the bailee receives notifica-
tion of the secured party's interest. Section 9-305.
83. Id., Comment 2. Cf. § 8-313(l)(d) ("Delivery [of an identified investment security
still in the possession of a third person] to a purchaser occurs when ... [the third] person
acknowledges that he holds for the purchaser ... ." (emphasis added)).
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collateral. Many items of pledgeable collateral, however, would never
be seen by inquiring creditors . 4 A second security interest could be
created through filing in certain cases,8s and in any event the debtor
could sell the collateral despite his nonpossession. 0 Often, it would
only be by pure accident that a prospective creditor would learn that
certain of the debtor's property was unavailable because now in the
possession of someone else. Whatever significance there is in the pledge
84. This could happen, assuming fraudulent intent on the part of the debtor, in almost
any case involving collateral that call be either pledgeable or nonpledgeable. If the
prospective creditor were satisfied to check the public filing system and the prospective
debtor's own financial records, he could easily be misled. Even if the prospectihe secured
party were to send his detective to the prospective debtor's place of business, the detective
would not see pledgeable items such as stocks, bonds, or cash. Cf. GILmORE at 463-64
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added):
It has often been suggested that modern techniques for the collection and com-
munication of credit information have made filing systems unnecessary and obsolete.
A businessman or a banker, it is said, in determining whether to extend credit or make
a loan relies, not on public records, but on financial statements-balance sheets and
profit and loss statements-submitted to him or to a specialized credit information
agency by the prospective borrower. Public files, even if they are easily available, will
be rarely consulted; they can in any case never be relied on since no filing system, in-
cluding that established by Article 9, is comprehensive in the sense that a check of
the files will reveal all possible encumbrances. So long as alternative methods of per-
fection are provided-such as possession by the secured party or the notation of liens
on certificates of title-which do not depend on filing, a search of the files will always
be inconclusive and crucial information must be procured front the borrower's finan-
cial statements. Since these statements are the best available, indeed the only avail-
able, sources of comprehensive credit information, and since they are in fact regularly
relied on in granting credit and loans, they should, the argument runs, be made the
basis of a truly modern system of creditor protection: public files should be scrapped
and appropriate safeguards introduced to protect people misled by false or incom-
plete statements. The reef on which this ingenious and attractive argument usually
founders is, of course, what these appropriate safeguards should be.
Financial statements, of course, rarely reflect a debtor's current status; they may be
months behind. Thus representations by the debtor are usually required as well.
85. If the prospective creditor of note 84 supra filed to perfect a security interest in
collateral that the debtor had pledged to someone else, his claim would be subordinate to
that of any creditor who had already either filed or perfected a security interest in the
same collateral. See § 9-312(5)(a); cf. § 9-304(2) (if goods are in possession of issuer of
negotiable document, security interest in document takes priority over any security interest
in goods perfected while goods are held by such issuer).
86. See note 87 infra. The bailee too could sell the collateral, see note 88 infra. As for
buyers of goods not in the ordinary course of business, see § 9-307(3) (protection against
certain future advances by secured party). For protection of holders in due course and
good faith purchasers of instruments, negotiable documents, and chattel paper, see §§ 9-
308, 9-309.
The other side of the coin appears when creditors of a seller are deemed to rely on
the seller's possession of goods he has already sold. This is primarily an Article 2 problem.
See generally Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buyer, 85 YALE L.J. 1 (1975);
Skilton, Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business Under Article 9 of the Uniform Con-
mercial Code (and Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REV. I; Speidel, Advance Payments in
Contracts for Sale of Manufactured Goods: A Look at the Uniform Commercial Code, 52
CALIF. L. REV. 281 (1964). As for the exposure of the pre-paying buyer to the seller's secured
creditor, see Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.V.2d 97 (1973), noted in
Jackson & Kronman, supra at 22 n.87, 23 n.91, 30 n.124 & 37 n.147.
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idea lies not in the secured party's possession but in the debtor's non-
possession, and nonpossession no longer gives much warning that the
property is subject to a security interest.
Indeed, it may be that even the assumption that the debtor, by
surrendering physical possession to the secured creditor, also surrenders
control over the collateral is no longer a valid premise. Until recently,
at least this much was taken for granted, and the secured party in
possession could entertain a justifiable belief that the debtor could
not physically dispose of the collateral, even to a buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business. But the New York Court of Appeals has re-
cently told us otherwise.8 7 This not only reemphasizes that the pledge
is a dubious means of giving public notice but also underscores the
need for our 1988 Committee to question the wisdom of another aspect
of the current rules of pledge-the exception from the statute of frauds
requirement of a security agreement that is signed by the debtor and
that describes the collateral. A debtor who surrenders possession may
have delivered the property for repair or for safekeeping or on lease.
Delivery in and of itself is not proof of purpose; certainly it is not
proof of the amount of debt secured or of the terms of the agreement.
When the collateral is in the possession of a bailee, both the public
notice assumption and the exception from the statute of frauds become
even more questionable, and the need for a fresh approach becomes
correspondingly clearer. It can happen all too easily that the bailee
is either unconscious of or unconcerned about his duties as the se-
cured party's "agent" and will allow the debtor to exercise control
over the collateral.88
87. Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 48 App. Div. 2d 784, 369 N.Y.S.2d
146 (1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976). Tanbro held
that a buyer in the ordinary course of business took free of a possessory security interest
in the goods. Section 9-307(1) protects "ordinary course" buyers of goods from security
interests "created by [the] seller even though the security interest is perfected and even
though the buyer knows of its existence." Professor Kripke, who participated in the
Tanbro case during its later stages, discusses the decision in his recent article, Should
Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply Against a Secured Party in
Possession?, 33 Bus. LAW. 153 (1977). He argues that the Code (presumably § 9-307(1) or
§ 1-201(9), which defines "buyer in ordinary course of business") be amended to exclude
from the "buyers of goods" protection of § 9-307(1) any goods subject to a possessory
security interest. The Tanbro decision might affect goods held in a public warehouse as
well as those in the seller's possession. On § 9-307(1), see generally Skilton, supra note 86.
88. Suppose D delivers his diamond-studded watch to the local jeweler for repairs. He
then decides to use the watch as collateral, and SP agrees to advance him money in re-
turn for a security interest in the watch. SP by mail (or SP's secretary by telephone)
"notifies" the local jeweler of D's agreement that the jeweler is to hold the watch for SP.
Note that the jeweler is not under SP's control; indeed, under § 2-402(2), (3), if an Article
9 bailee is engaged in selling such goods, he can sell the collateral to a buyer in the
ordinary course of business, and the buyer takes free and clear of any security interest in
the property. And here, where the jeweler is a bailee only by the accident of possessing a
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Public filing or recording systems were originally considered "merely
as a less desirable alternative to possession."S 9 Perhaps the question of
whether public filing suffices to replace a physical change of possession
should now be reversed: is the surrender of possession really the equiva-
lent of some kind of public record of the existence of a security in-
terest? It is obvious that creditors usually bottom their credit judg-
ments on examinations of their debtor's financial statements, not on
his possession or nonpossession of particular items of property. The
notion of public notice through filing may also be overplayed, 90 but,
on the whole, placing even a sketchy warning on the public record
seems a much more effective way to protect the rights of all affected
parties. The unfortunate dilemma is that neither the existing Article
9 filing system nor the physical pledge seems quite adequate or appro-
priate for the types of security transactions that are emerging from
new developments in commercial practices.
B. "Paperless" Instruments: Problems for Article 9
Developments in business practices during the last decade evidence
a growing need for some method of conducting commercial transac-
tions, including but not limited to the creation and perfection of se-
curity interests, without having to handle the traditionally necessary
watch in need of repair and likely has little interest in the financial problems of his
customer's creditors, it is quite possible that he would allow his customer to control the
disposition of his property.
It is true that § 9-205, which repeals the "policing" rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S.
353 (1925), by providing that "[a] security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against
creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to [use or dispose of collateral or proceeds]
... or by reason of the failure of the secured party to require the debtor to account for
proceeds or replace collateral," expressly states that it does not relax the requirements of
possession when the collateral is held by a bailee. The Comment to § 9-205 emphasizes
that the "common law rules on the degree and extent of possession . . . necessary to
perfect a pledge interest" are retained and that a secured party may lose his perfected
security interest if he "allow[s] the debtor access to and control over the goods." Section 9-
205, Comment 6.
There have been some intriguing cases dealing with the question of whom a bailee is
acting for. In In re Dolly Madison, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the district
court held that an escrow agent could not be a proper bailee of stock certificates because
it held for both parties. The Third Circuit affirmed per curiam, 480 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.
1973), and then had to eat its words when confronted with In re Copeland, 391 F. Supp.
134 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd in relevant part, 531 F.2d 1195, 1202-05 (3d Cir. 1976). See also
Heinicke Instruments Co. v. Republic Corp., 543 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1976), discussed at
pp. 1041-42 infra.
89. GILMoRE at 438; see id. at 462.
90. An Article 9 financing statement usually gives precious little information, but even
the skimpiest will tell any potential creditor who bothers to look that the debtor has done
or may do something to encumber a type or types of his property. See § 9-402(1)
(financing statement sufficient if it contains names and addresses of parties, appropriate
signatures, and "a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral").
On the rationale of this type of "notice filing," see GILMORE at 466-80.
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piece of paper. In part they reflect as well recent changes in methods
of handling commercial transactions brought about by the electronic
age. Two specific problems that arose from these developments have
already been addressed and supposedly solved. The 1988 Committee
will have to decide whether the solutions devised are, as I suspect,
less than ideal, and whether the declining commercial importance of
paper that embodies the rights of the parties signifies a corresponding
decline in the importance of "possession."
1. Federal "Book Entry" for United States Bonds
Not too many years ago, federal fiscal authorities became disturbed
over the number of robberies of federal government bonds, principally
while in transit from one holder to another. During a brief period,
several very substantial amounts had been stolen, and it was feared
that United States bonds might become unattractive to some of the
Treasury's biggest customers. This led to a search for a safer method
of transferring ownership or other interests without the physical trans-
fer of an instrument in a form convenient to a thief.
"Instruments" (such as United States bonds) are exclusively pledge-
able collateral under Article 9; perfection thus requires the transfer
of possession of a piece of paper enticing to a thief.01 Why, the federal
fiscal authorities asked, could not the instrument, or at least its transfer,
be eliminated and the rights of the holders (including secured parties)
be evidenced in some other fashion? Article 9 offered some help-if
Authority X physically possessed bonds in which other parties held
interests, transfers could be made among the parties by "notification"
to Authority X as a section 9-305 bailee, followed no doubt by some
proper record. The bonds in Authority X's vault would not have to
be disturbed. But such a procedure is limited in its scope; further, it
demands that someone physically possess the bonds. A section 9-305
arrangement would have immobilized some bonds, but the interested
parties desired not merely to immobilize the bonds but rather to
eliminate the vexing piece of paper entirely.
Hence, the federal authorities, dissatisfied with what could be done
under state law, devised a new solution-federal "book entry," a mech-
anism by which bonds could be delivered through banking channels
to a Federal Reserve Bank, an appropriate entry made on the federal
books, and the bonds themselves burned. Upon demand, the bank that
had deposited the bonds could be issued an equivalent amount evi-
91. Section 9-105(i); note 79 supra. But cf. §§ 9-504(4), (5), 9-306(3) (temporary perfec-
tion without change of possession under certain limited circumstances).
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denced by new pieces of paper. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States92
and related cases93 apparently authorized federal preemption on a
matter so closely related to federal fiscal interests, and in 1972 a Federal
Reserve regulation94 preempted the area-except that the method of
perfecting security interests in the cremated bonds was left largely to
state law, that is, to Article 9. The regulation simply provided that
the entire book entry mechanism would be deemed to have the effect
of a pledge of the bonds. 95 State law entered at the point at which it
became necessary to perfect the security interest by giving notice to
the bailee under section 9-305.
This solution, however, was flawed, as illustrated by the following
hypothetical put to me by a New York law firm that represented
one of the banks. Bondholder delivers $1,000,000 in designated United
States bonds to Small City Bank for safekeeping. Small City Bank
accepts the bonds as a favor to a valued depositor, but because it
has inadequate physical facilities for storage, it ships the bonds to its
correspondent Albany Bank. Albany Bank, however, has only modest
facilities; it forwards the bonds to New York City Bank, which deals
heavily in United States bonds. New York City Bank knows of the
new Federal Reserve regulation and transfers the bonds to the "Fed."
The Fed, in accordance with the regulation, makes a notation of the
receipt of the bonds from New York City Bank and then burns them.
Bondholder, in Small City, now decides to borrow $500,000 from Y
Bank against the bonds he delivered to Small City Bank. He knows
nothing of their successive transfers or of their subsequent destruction.
Y Bank has no problem with Bondholder's credit, but how should it
proceed mechanically? If there can really be a "bailment" of non-
existent bonds, who is the bailee whom Y Bank must notify under
section 9-305? Albany Bank? New York City Bank? Clearly, it is not
the Fed, for not only does the regulation seem to negate this possi-
bility,9 6 but the Fed's record also stops with its immediate depositor,
who is not Bondholder.
92. 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943), as amended, 318 U.S. 744 (1943) (per curiam) ("rights and
duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal
rather than local law").
93. See, e.g., National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945)
(commercial paper); cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311, 305-11 (1947)
(extending Clearfield Trust rule beyond context of commercial paper, but emphasizing
that "question . . . is chiefly one of federal fiscal policy").
94. 36 Fed. Reg. 6749 (1971), codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 306.115-.123 (1972), as revised, 37
Fed. Reg. 8671 (1972).
95. 31 C.F.R. § 306.118(b) (1972).
96. The regulation never mentioned the problem and did not authorize the Federal
Reserve to perform the function of a bailee.
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It was the general opinion of bank counsel that section 9-305 would
be interpreted to require notification to the only bank of which Bond-
holder had any knowledge-Small City Bank. But this answer was not
free from doubt, and banks do not like to make loans aggregating
billions of dollars on what is "probably" the law. Bondholder's proper-
ty, after the burning, was a right to obtain a new piece of paper, that
is, a general intangible as to which perfection would have been through
filing-an idea that may have been ahead of its time. Perhaps Article
9 could have been amended to allow Bondholder to perfect a security
interest in his right to get a new bond in some other way, but amend-
ing the federal regulation was much easier. In the end, the banks per-
suaded the Federal Reserve to displace state law completely with
a further regulation.07 As a result, a large chunk of secured transac-
tions in government bonds is now governed by federal law and thus
largely withdrawn from the jurisdiction of Article 9.
In this instance Article 9 was unable to meet a highly specialized
change in commercial practice. The possibility of filing as to a right
that might later be reconverted into an instrument (a new bond) was
scarcely discussed; the bar was unaccustomed to the idea. Resort to
federal preemption was no doubt an appropriate solution to the im-
mediate problem, but the experience is troubling for two reasons. The
first is the nature of the solution-a declaration by federal fiat that a
nonpledge has the effect of a pledge. Federal book entry is a unique
security system concocted to govern an area in which possession of an
instrument is the sole traditional method of perfecting a security in-
terest; it bears no resemblance to "pledge," and its connection to the
requirement of public notice of security interests is none too close.
Perfection through possession may have deep historical roots, but must
we distort the facts by "deeming" that there has been a transfer of
possession when in fact there is nothing to possess? Draftsmen in 1988
should devise a straightforward and more flexible method of perfect-
ing security interests in a debtor's assets when, for good reasons, his
assets are no longer represented by a piece of paper.
The second troubling aspect of the federal book entry experience
is the source of the solution-federal preemption of state law. If it is
necessary or desirable to permit security interests in important seg-
ments of commercial practice to be perfected by new methods, should
not Article 9 be revised to provide those methods? A federal filing
97. 38 Fed. Reg. 7078 (1973), codified at 31 C.F.R. §§ 306.115-.122 (1976). The amended
regulation now makes clear that the Federal Reserve is not the bailee and provides that
notification is to be made to the depositary that maintains the account of the pledgor. 31
C.F.R. § 306.188(b) (1976).
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system may sometimes be appropriate, but federal preemption should
not be relied on as a panacea for deficiencies in state law. The next
time a problem arises, even with respect to federal securities, the
relation to governmental purposes may be less direct, and preemption
may not be an alternative. If United States bonds were the only ex-
ample of a need for new means of giving the required public notice
of the creation of a security interest, the absence of a solution in
Article 9 would be relatively unimportant. But they are not the only
example; the problem has surfaced elsewhere, most notably in the
context of investment securities, and it seems unlikely to diminish
in importance.
2. Investment Securities and the Proposed New Article 8
Investment securities-stock, bonds, or other evidences of indebted-
ness-are "instruments" under Article 9.9S The serious difficulties that
can attend the required transfer of a necessary piece of paper in se-
curity transactions surfaced with the tremendous increase in transac-
tions in investment securities during the late 1960s. The resulting
"paperwork crunch" intensified the need to reduce the large volumes
of paper involved in such transactions, and the result was a new sec-
tion in the Code's article on investment securities-section 8-320. 90
Insofar as it affects the creation and perfection of security interests,
section 8-320 is built around sections 9-304 and 9-305 but does not
replace either. With the aid of definitions elsewhere in Article 8, it
allows the pledge of an investment security to be effected by making
appropriate entries on the books of a "clearing corporation" 100 to
reduce the account of the pledgor and increase that of the pledgee. 101
Clearing corporations organized pursuant to section 8-320 seem to
have solved part of the problem of the paperwork crunch, but at best
98. See note 79 supra (general perfection rule and temporary, limited exceptions).
99. For brief summaries of the "paperwork crunch" problems, see HONNOLD, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF CREDIT TRANSACTIONS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 170-73 (1976);
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PROPOSED REVISION OF
ARTICLE 8 AND RELATED CHANGES IN OTHER ARTICLES RECOMMENDED BY THE PERMANENT
EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE iX, XV (1977) [hereinafter cited with-
out cross reference as PROPOSED REVISION OF ARTICLE 8]. See also Coogan, The New UCC
Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REv. 477, 558-63 (1973), reprinted in 1 COOCAN, HOGAN & VAGTS
§§ 3A.01-.07, -.07[1] (discussing § 8-320 and citing literature).
100. A clearing corporation is "a corporation all of the capital stock of which is held
by or for a national securities exchange or association registered tinder a statute of the
United States such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Section 8-102(3). Cf. PROPOSED
REVISION OF ARTICLE 8 § 8-102(3) (proposing changes in definition of "clearing corpora-
tion" not here relevant).
101. The securities must have been shown on the books of the clearing corporation in
the account of the pledgor. Section 8-320(1)(c).
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they do no more than ameliorate the larger problem of dealing in
securities without depending on stock certificates. A recent Ninth
Circuit case 10 2 offers an instructive example. A corporate officer had
assigned to a bank a large number of unissued shares of a new private
offering of his corporation's stock, as security for the loan that had al-
lowed him to purchase them. 10 3 The officer directed the corporation
to send the stock certificates directly to the bank, but actual issuance
of the certificates was delayed by the need for approval by an outside
authority. Probably through error, the certificates, when finally issued,
were sent to the corporation, and a different creditor attached them
before they could be forwarded to the bank. The bank claimed that
the officer's instructions to the corporation constituted notice to a
bailee under section 9-305 and that its security interest had been per-
fected. The Ninth Circuit disagreed: not only was the corporation
insufficiently independent of the debtor's control for its possession
of the certificates to have been adequate public notice, but there had
also been no "bailment." Prior to actual issuance of the shares, the
debtor had possessed no "instrument" that he could bail; hence his
rights in the shares were general intangibles,'0° as to which the only
method of perfection was U.C.C. filing.105 In this respect the case
differed from the federal book entry situation, which was complicated
by the regulation's "deeming" that an actual pledge had occurred.
The Ninth Circuit's decision was probably correct under the ex-
isting provisions of Article 9, but filing, as currently constructed, may
seem of doubtful wisdom as a method of perfecting security interests
in investment securities, at least in our present way of thinking. 0 6
102. Heinicke Instruments Co. v. Republic Corp., 543 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1976).
103. The loan transaction actually went through an intermediary, who subsequently
dropped out of the picture. See id. at 701.
104. 543 F.2d at 702. "General intangibles" is the catch-all definitional category of
Article 9. "'General intangibles' means any personal property (including things in action)
other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, and money." Section
9-106.
105. 543 F.2d at 702. See p. 1032 & note 79 supra.
106. The present filing systems require the recordation of a written "financing state-
ment," see § 9-402, and generally impose both filing and search fees, see §§ 9-403(1), (5)
(filing fees), 405(1), (2) (filing and search fees), 9-406 (filing fees for release statements),
9-407(2) (optional section) (search fees). A financing statement generally remains effective
for five years after filing, § 9-403(2), unless specifically terminated pursuant to § 9-404.
Moreover, there are filing offices not only in each state but also in many localities. See
§ 9-401(1) (three alternatives for combinations of statewide and local filing); 3 U.L.A.
Uniform Commercial Code 236-40 (1968) (cataloging states adopting various versions of
§ 9-401(l)).
These requirements, along with the decentralization of the system, necessarily impose
burdens of time, expense, and inconvenience-burdens that make the system unsuitable
for rapid or frequent transactions (such as those in investment securities), especially if
the transactions are often interstate. See note 147 infra. Cf. GILMORE at 463 (noting
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Perhaps the case can be regarded as a freak, but it is a simple illts-
tration of a common problem that arises whenever one wishes to
create a security interest in shares of stock that one owns but that
are not represented by a stock certificate. Many, perhaps most, mu-
tual funds discourage their shareholders from requesting certificates,
and many corporations offer dividend reinvestment plans, under which
frequent issues of shares would be a nuisance. A shareholder, how-
ever, may wish to borrow against his unissued shares. If no certificate
is issued, there exists no "instrument" for someone to "possess" or
"bail." Perhaps we must learn to accept the Ninth Circuit's reasoning,
but, until we do, a prospective secured party will not feel very secure
with perfection through filing on the theory that unissued stock is a
general intangible,107 and the shareholder may find it necessary to
demand that his shares be represented by a certificate if he wishes
to borrow against them.
Worried members of the securities industry continued their prob-
lem-solving efforts after the successful creation of section 8-320. Non-
Code groups, principally the Committee on Stock Transfers of the
American Bar Association's section on Corporations, Business and
Banking, drafted a new Article 8.108 With modest changes, that ABA
draft has now been approved by the Code sponsors, the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. The proposed Article 8 would supplement and
replace certain sections of Article 9.109 But it would adhere to the cen-
tral concept of "possession," even where there is nothing to possess."10
"the unfortunate fact that the [pre-Code] filing systems tended to proliferate" and that
this "made the filing system as a whole cumbersome, expensive to maintain and ineffective
to serve its principal functions . . . of providing creditors with an easily available method
of checking on a borrower's financial status [and of] providing lenders . . . [with] an easy
and certain method of perfecting their security interests").
That the draftsmen were aware at least of the time burden is evidenced by the various
provisions for temporary automatic perfection of certain nonpossessory transactions. Sec-
tions 9-301(2); 9-304(4), (5); 9-306(2), (3).
107. If a creditor, following Heinicke, filed to perfect a security interest in a right to
obtain stock for which no certificate had yet been issued, and the debtor, after obtaining
a certificate, pledged it to a second creditor who qualified as a bona fide purchaser, the
purchaser would have priority under § 9-309. This accords with the treatment of a filed
security interest in an account that is later transformed into a negotiable instrument; the
claim of a holder in due course will defeat that of the secured party who filed as to the
account. Section 9-309.
108. PROPOSED REvisIoN OF ARTICLE 8. The Permanent Editorial Board explicitly
acknowledges its debt to the ABA Committee. See id. at ix-x, xv.
109. See id. at 85-91 (setting out proposed changes in Article 9). Essentially, the changes
would exempt security interests in investment securities from the perfection requirements
of Article 9, in accordance with the scheme outlined in the text that follows.
110. The proposed Article 8, as the following text makes clear, does not rely on per-
fection through filing on the theory that certificateless stock is a general intangible. I do
not know whether filing was seriously considered by the draftsmen of the new Article 8,
but the Permanent Editorial Board did not give it any great thought.
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The new Article 8 supposes that state corporate law allows or will
be amended to allow corporations to issue "uncertificated securities,"
rights in which would not be embodied in an "instrument" or other
piece of paper. By definition, an uncertificated security would be a
general intangible;"' the certificated security would remain an in-
strument, essentially unchanged. The creation, perfection, and termi-
nation of security interests in both certificated and uncertificated
securities would be governed entirely by new section 8-321, which pro-
vides that "[a] security interest in a security is enforceable and can
attach only if it is transferred to the secured party or a person desig-
nated by him pursuant to a provision of subsection (1) of Section
8-313."11 2 Any such "transfer" by one with rights in the security to one
who has given value would create a fully perfected security interest." 3
The critical corollary is section 8-313(1), which defines "transfer."
With respect to perfection of security interests in certificated securi-
ties, the basic method would remain physical transfer of possession."14
If the security were controlled by a third party, there would be several
alternatives. Book entry through a clearing corporation would be one;
book entry plus confirmation to the pledgee would be another." 5
With respect to most security interests in uncertificated securities, sec-
tion 8-313(l)(b) contemplates a form of book entry-registration by
the issuing corporation."" An initial security interest in uncertificated
securities could be created by registration of transfer, which duplicates
the effect of outright transfer of a certificated security into the name
of the pledgee; or it could be created by registration of pledge to
create a "registered pledgee," which duplicates the effect of a pledge
111. Section 9-105(i) would be amended to include only certificated securities in the
definition of "instrument." PROPOSED REVISION OF ARTICLE 8, at 85. Uncertificated securities
would, by process of elimination, be "general intangibles" within the catch-all definition
of § 9-106. See note 104 supra. Other proposed changes in Article 9 make this quite clear.
See PROPOSED REVISION OF ARTICLE 8, at 85.
Under proposed § 8-321(3)(a), no filing would ever be required to perfect security in-
terests in securities; proposed § 9-305 would exclude certificated securities from the class
of collateral for which perfection through possession is required or permitted. See PROPOSED
REVISION OF ARTICLE 8, at 89-90.
112. Id. § 8-321(1).
113. Id. § 8-321(2).
114. Id. § 8-313(I)(a) (an analogue to current § 9-304(1)).
115. See id. § 8-313(la)(a), (c), (d), (e), (g); id. at xviii-xix (Reporter's Introductory
Comimient explaining proposed changes). If the controlling party is a financial intermediary
that is not a clearing corporation, confirmation to the transferee must accompany book
entry. Id. § 8-313(l)(d). This provision is designed to afford "objective evidence" of a
transfer, which was considered desirable because the proposed expansion of the concept of
"broker," see id. § 8-313(4), includes financial intermediaries that, unlike clearing corpora-
tions, may be beneficial owners of securities not held in account for their customers. See id.
at 49.
116. The procedure, which corresponds to that now used to register transfers of
ownership, is spelled out in id. §§ 8-401, 8-402.
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when the pledgee takes delivery but allows the securities pledged to
remain registered in the name of the pledgor."
7
The new concept of an uncertificated security and the mechanisms
that attend it thus pay more than lip service to the law of pledge. The
secured party, the debtor, and third parties would be placed in po-
sitions designed to resemble as closely as possible those that they would
have occupied had there been a physical pledge. The registered pledgee
would acquire exclusive power over further transfers of the pledged
security,118 just as though he had physical possession of a stock cer-
tificate. He could transfer ownership of the uncertificated security
outright, free from or subject to his pledge, or transfer his security
interest to another secured party. 119 In a further effort to duplicate
the results of physical transfer, proposed section 8-313(h)(iv) provides
that a junior pledge is effected by notification to the registered pledgee,
rather than by notification to the issuer. The junior pledge, unlike
the registered pledge or a lien obtained through legal proceedings,
would not necessarily be reflected on the issuer's records. 12° Thus the
registered pledgee, like a pledgee under existing law, could sell the
uncertificated security to a bona fide purchaser who would have no
notice of the junior pledge; presumably, the junior pledgor would
have only his present remedy of a claim against the first (registered)
pledgee.' 21 This undesirable result is a regrettable incident necessitated
by the supposed importance of possession of the stock certificate; here,
of course, there is no certificate. It might be argued that the issuer
should not be required to take the trouble to register junior pledges,
even though junior pledges of stock are thought to be rare. Nonethe-
less, there seems no reason to fall back on the rules of the pledge; some
other method, one that would in fact give public notice of the junior
pledge, would be preferable.
117. Id. § 8-313(1)(b); id. at xx-xxiii (Reporter's Introductory Comnent explaining
proposed changes). Two additional provisions, which would apply to both certificated and
uncertificated securities, would complete the preemption of Article 9 as to investment
securities by providing mechanisms that correspond to § 9-305 (perfection through notifica-
tion of bailee) and § 9-304(4) (automatic perfection of security interest in instrument for
21 days when new value is given pursuant to existing security agreement). See PRoIoSED
REVISION OF ARTICLE 8 § 8-313(h), (i); id. at 49-50.
118. See id. § 8-207(3), (4) (power to order transfer); § 8-308(7)(b), (8) (power to
originate "instruction" to issuer to register transfer, pledge, or release from pledge).
119. Id. § 8-207(4); id. at 24-25.
120. Id. § 8-403(4)(a) (duty of issuer to note adverse claims embodied in legal process).
The issuer is not under a duty to note other claims unless notified in writing by the
registered owner or registered pledgee. Id. § 8-403(4)(b); cf. id. § 8-403(4)(c), (d) (limited
exceptions).
121. See id. at xxxi-xxxii (Reporter's Introductory Comment explaining proposed
changes), 72-73.
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No doubt there is merit in attempting to provide for identical re-
suits regardless of whether an investment security subject to a security
interest is certificated and hence an "instrument" or uncertificated
and hence a "general intangible." But, although a decade of experi-
ence with the new Article 8 could demonstrate otherwise, there seems
to be little logic in basing results on the concepts and assumptions
of "possession" despite the fact that no item exists to possess. Professor
Gilmore once submitted that one should look to commercial practice
to determine whether a piece of paper falls within the "exclusively
pledgeable" category: if the commercial world attaches great symbolic
significance to possession of the paper in question, as with the classic
negotiable instrument, the rules of pledge should apply. 12 2 The mu-
tation of Article 8 indicates that the modern commercial world not
only cares little about possession but also must function without re-
gard even to the existence of the representative paper. The 1988 Com-
mittee to Review Article 9 should consider whether the pattern of
the traditional pledge belongs in such a world at all and, if not, wheth-
er filing as to all general intangibles or some other notice method
would be the most appropriate solution.
C. Some Thoughts on Possible Revisions
Awkward or complicated mechanisms can be borne, at least in iso-
lated areas. But if they are out of accord with commercial needs, they
are unlikely to be tolerated very long. Moreover, they undermine the
U.C.C.'s stated purposes of simplifying, clarifying, and modernizing
the law and of permitting the development of new commercial prac-
tices. 12 3 To the extent that they do not fit the nature of the transac-
tions they govern, there is also good potential for undermining the
uniformity, either in statutory language or in court decisions, that
the U.C.C. seeks to achieve -.1 24 This is especially true if solutions are
devised by persons other than the sponsors of the U.C.C. Adjusting
the statute to developments such as those sketched above should be
a major goal of the 1988 Committee to Review Article 9. The task
will not be an easy one, but the need, which is pressing even now,
is sure to expand beyond its present bounds.
For clear evidence that the diminishing importance of "paper" and,
generally, of physical evidence of claims to or rights in property as
necessary accompaniments to commercial transactions, one need only
122. GmLmom at 379.
123. Section 1-102(2)(a), (b).
124. Section 1-102(2)(c).
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look at the burgeoning field of electronic fund transfers (EFT). EFT
transactions encompass a variety of issues, including transactions by
point-of-sale and automatic teller machines, check guarantee transac-
tions, pre-authorized debit and credit transactions conducted through
automated clearing houses, credit card transactions, and wire and tele-
phone transfers. The field is under intense study by the U.C.C.'s
"3-4-8" Subcommittee 2 5 and has recently been the subject of reports
by the National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers, 12 6 which
for several years explored ways of developing rules to govern pay-
ments and transfers made without using the kinds of commercial pa-
per now regulated by Articles 3 and 4. The import for Article 9 is
less obvious at present, but as EFT practices expand, secured trans-
action problems are certain to arise. Moreover, one can predict with
some confidence that EFT will not be the only technological advance
that will jeopardize old customs and old assumptions, particularly
those based on the notion that certain claims or rights depend on
"possession" of a particular item of collateral-an idea that presupposes
the existence of something tangible to possess.127
125. The 3-4-8 Subcommittee of the U.C.C.'s Permanent Editorial Board is so called
because EFT transactions primarily implicate Articles 3, 4, and 8 of the U.C.C. The Sub-
committee has not yet issued a report on EFT, but its Reporter recently delivered a
proposed report, which is scheduled for public discussion by interested parties at an ALI-
ABA Conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, April 8-10, 1978. The Subcommittee probably
will not issue an official report on EFT at least for some time after the ALI-ABA Con-
ference. The Chairman indicated in 1976 that thorough study might require four or five
years before the Committee could propose amendments to the Code. See NATIONAL COm-
MISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, EFT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 16-17, 17 n.16 (in-
terim report Feb. 23, 1977) (citing testimony of Robert Haydock, Jr., chairman of 3-4-8
Subcommittee, before National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers, Oct. 26, 1976).
126. The Commission was established in 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974),
as amended, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1124 (1975). It recently submitted its final report
to Congress. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, EFT IN THE UNITED
STATES: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (final report Oct. 28, 1977).
It had earlier submitted both a policy report and an interim report. NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, PROGRAMS, PLANS, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS (policy report Oct. 29, 1976); NATIONAL COl-
MISSION ON ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, supra note 125 (interim report Feb. 23, 1977).
127. For confirmation of the logic of this assertion, see GILMORE at 439 (footnote
omitted):
In the nature of things possession can be available as a perfection device only where
the collateral has, at least in contemplation of law, a tangible existence.... [P]osses-
sion is a meaningless concept when applied to an intangible claim not evidenced by
a writing which represents the claim. A purely intangible claim . . . [has] nothing
visible which can be transferred in possession[; thus] it cannot be pledged. Never-
theless, security agreements relating to such intangibles frequently use language of
pledge; the language is sometimes meaningless, is sometimes . . . an indication that
the transaction is a transfer for security rather than a sale . . . , and is sometimes,
in the case of novel types of intangible collateral, an attempt to make clear that some
kind of security arrangement is being set up in a situation where nobody knows what
the rules of the game are.
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The sponsors of the Code could choose from a number of alterna-
tives for dealing with these new challenges. They could, of course,
decline to take up the gauntlet. This would lead to a scattered farming
out of responsibility: to federal authorities, as occurred with the
United States bonds crisis and may occur with EFT;1 28 or to state
legislatures and courts, as with motor vehicle certificate of title laws12 9
and the confusion of leasing law.130 They could create new classes
of collateral and attendant rules, as is somewhat true of the new
Article 8 approach;13 ' or they could studiously attempt to adapt old
categories and rules, as is certainly true of the new Article 8 ap-
proach.' 3 2 The latter two alternatives do not seem to be the most
logical and efficient that could be devised, and they might force
courts to solve difficult conceptual problems resulting from overlaps
or gaps among various sets of rules. None of these approaches seems
likely to promote the U.C.C.'s purposes. Instead, our future revisers
of Article 9, who will have the valuable aid of hindsight in evaluating
the alternatives sketched above, should rethink the statutory frame-
work from a fresh perspective. If public notice is to be required for
most security interests, should the means of giving it vary with the
nature of the collateral? Or is there a better way? Here, the history
128. The National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfers has already recom-
mended congressional action in certain areas. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON ELE-rRONIC
FUND TRANSFERS, supra note 126, at 6-17 (final report Oct. 28, 1977). As noted at pp. 1038-
40 supra, however, federal preemption may not be an alternative when federal fiscal
interests are not in ohed. Indeed, I was once asked whether something similar to federal
book entry for United States bonds might be devised as a mechanism for allowing savings
and loan associations to perfect security interests in batches of mortgages without actually
taking possession of the pieces of paper. I concluded that, under the present law, see notes
92 & 93 supra, this could not be accomplished under federal law.
129. Most states require notation of security interests on motor vehicle certificates of
title, and Article 9 explicitly defers to this alternative method of public notice. See § 9-
302(3)(b); cf. id. § 9-103(2) (special conflicts-of-law rules respecting goods covered by
certificates of title issued by states that require notation of security interests on such
certificates). The certificate of title mechanisms have not proved easy to live with. See
pp. 1049-50 & notes 142-143 infra.
130. Leases intended as security arrangements are subject to Article 9, §§ 1-201 (37),
9-102(2). "True" leases are not. The distinction is absurdly elusive under the present
Code provisions, but it could be quite simply stated. See Coogan, Leases of Equipment and
Some Other Unconventional Security Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and
Article 9-Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper--Consignments-Buyer's Security Interest,
1973 DUKE L.J. 909, reprinted with additions in 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGs §§ 4A.01-.08.
Leasing has become a very large area of commercial transactions; no uniform law governs
the rights and duties of the parties. If, for good reasons or bad, businessmen choose to
acquire the use of billions of dollars' worth of equipment through leases rather than sales,
should not the field be brought tnder the aegis of the U.C.C.?
131. As noted at p. 1043 & note 111 supra, the proposed Article 8 would create the
new "uncertificated security" but would classify it as a general intangible.
132. See pp. 1043-45 supra (describing manner in which proposed Article 8 would
contort pledge model to fit problem of uncertificated securities).
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of the statute offers instruction that, even at present, suggests at least
a first step in improving Article 9.
The original idea of the draftsmen was that formal differences
among the various pre-Code security devices should be abandoned;
they initially assumed, however, that then-current financing transac-
tions were "so diverse" that different statutes, separated along func-
tional (as opposed to formal) lines, would be required. 133 The scheme
ultimately proved unnecessary; the perceived differences dissolved be-
fore the drafters' eyes, and the different statutes became more and
more the same. Hence, the article was reorganized into a single statu-
tory scheme.13 4 This "made largely irrelevant the painstakingly precise
definitions" of the types of collateral that were to have fallen within
the contemplated categories of financing transactions; nonetheless, the
draftsmen "[u]nfortunately ...never [thought] to see whether the
classifying definitions could not usefully be consigned to oblivion. The
Article in its final form clung grimly to its four-fold classification
of goods and its six-fold classification of intangibles."' 35 Folded into
the classifications was the supposedly basic functional distinction be-
tween possessory and nonpossessory interests, pledgeable and non-
pledgeable collateral.
These classifications have never been of paramount importance
for most purposes,13 6 with the exceptions of the statute of frauds re-
quirement and the method of giving public notice. They now appear
to be less significant than ever. It has always been the case that an
Article 9 security interest need not be tied to an exclusive category of
collateral; "fluid" or interchangeable collateral is an underlying con-
cept of the statute, as witnessed by its "floating lien" and by its provi-
sion for automatic transformation of a security interest from one in
specified tangible property to one in tangible or intangible proceeds.
13 7
This concept is now commercially legitimate, as confirmed by its
utilization in the proposed new Bankruptcy Act. Never have the cate-
gories of collateral been absolute, as evidenced by the familiar trans-
formation of "nonpossessory" accounts into "possessory" instruments, 38
133. GILMORE at 290.
134. Id. at 292.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 293.
137. See pp. 1016-17 & notes 21, 22 supra (describing floating lien); § 9-306(2), (3)
(temporary automatic perfection of security interest in proceeds).
138. The "mutation" of collateral, including that of accounts into instruments or gen-
eral intangibles, is discussed briefly in GILMORE at 386-87. Professor Gilnore's foresight
here proves to have been faulty; he speculated that
[m]utations do occur, and when they do they alwa)s move in one direction: intangibles
become instruments, more or less negotiable. The mutations are infrequent and the
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and now they at times approach fungibility, as indicated by the new
uncertificated security (a general intangible), which can become, at
corporate or shareholder whim, a certificated security (an instru-
ment) .139 EFT, and "paperless" transactions generally, further jumble
the categories and further undermine the distinction between possessory
and nonpossessory interests and its attendant classes of pledgeable and
nonpledgeable collateral. 140
Although Article 9 could now be written without distinguishing
among so many kinds of collateral, the distinctions have usually done
little harm and may at times be useful. Workable rules to govern,
for instance, rights of the parties upon default or priorities may have
to vary according to the nature of the collateral, though future drafts-
men may well conclude differently. But the distinctions based on
''possession" seem to be losing their utility and should be reconsidered
with an eye to their abolition, especially in the provisions for public
notice and for exemption from the statute of frauds. It would seem
that the purposes of giving notice are the same regardless of the nature
of the collateral, even though the amount of information that can be
placed on public record and the location of the record may vary. Fu-
ture draftsmen may be able to devise a single, comprehensive means
of satisfying the public notice requirement. If they can, they will have
taken a long step toward adapting Article 9 to the demands of the
modem commercial world. Nor would they be without guidance in
searching for an appropriate mechanism, for the various existing meth-
ods of giving notice all point toward centralized filing, or recordation,
as the best choice: efforts to dispense with the pledge without relying
on filing have had questionable results, and more recently devised sys-
tems all attempt to set up a sort of "notice filing" mechanism.
One of the best examples of an attempt to devise a notice system
that relies neither on filing nor on possession is the established prac-
tice of noting security interests in automobiles on the vehicles' certifi-
market-place evidence that one has occurred usually becomes overwhelming in a short
period of time. It seems unlikely that this theoretical problem will ever become a
real source of trouble.
Id. at 386. We might query whether, even in the brief period since this was written, the
trend has not reversed-e.g., stock certificates (instruments) have become general in-
tangibles.
139. A shareholder would be allowed to elect to have a certificate issued for his un-
certificated stock, and vice-versa. See PROPOSED REVISION OF ARTcL 8 § 8-407(2)-(4).
Presumably, a corporation would be free to issue whatever type of shares it wanted; if it
regularly issued both types, however, it would have to fulfill the "exchangeability" re-
quirements. Id. § 8-407(l).
140. GILMORE at 291-92: "Acceptance of the distinction between the possessory and
nonpossessory interest... required definitions of intangibles which could be pledged...."
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cates of title, which were originally required as an antitheft measure. 41
This method is specifically tailored to the nature of the collateral.
The practice was a response to the inappropriateness of other con-
ventional notice systems: a motor vehicle is too likely to move from
the place of filing for that method to be effective and too mobile
for perfection through possession to have even surface logic. But the
system has not worked well, primarily because of the importance of
the piece of paper involved,142 and at least one experienced practitioner
recently concluded that the system should be scrapped in favor of what
amounts to a computerized federal filing system. 14a Federal book entry
for United States bonds and registration of some transfers of investment
securities both rely on a sort of centralized recordation, although
neither divorces its system from the pattern of pledge nor provides all
creditors with a means of obtaining information. A 1966 French statute
on leasing demonstrates a mixed approach; it subjects companies that
habitually lease their equipment or machinery to the reporting require-
ments of the banking laws. The debtor (lessee) must file both his annual
and his more frequent periodic accounting records in a public office;
the obvious intent is that the notice that certain items possessed by
the debtor are leased rather than owned appear both on the public
record (as with an Article 9 filing) and on the debtor's own financial
statements.'"
These different public notice mechanisms all imply that recordation
in some designated place (usually a public office) is the most desir-
able method of ensuring that potential creditors can discover the state
of their prospective debtors' affairs or at least obtain enough infor-
mation to guide further inquiries. This sounds quite familiar, for
141. See GmioRE at 550-52.
142. See Meyers, Multi-State Motor Vehicle Transactions under the Uniform corn.
mercial Code: An Update, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 834 (1977). Mr. Meyers sets forth the history
of title certificate laws and discusses in detail the numerous problems created by inter-
state movement of vehicles covered by a certificate or-more problematically-by more
than one certificate. See, e.g., id. at 855-57.
143. Id. at 887-90. Mr. Meyers' proposal would not dispense with the physical certificate
but emphasizes that "[t]ransfer of ownership or perfection of liens would be accomplished
only on the [federal] records . . ., not by notation or delivery of the certificate." Id. at 889.
144. Loi n* 66-455 du 2 juillet 1966, [1966] D.S.L. 305. The banking statutes made ap-
plicable by this law are Loi du 13 juin 1941, [1941] D.A.L. 333, and Loi du 14 juin 1941,
[1941] D.A.L. 337. The first contains the most relevant provisions. See, e.g., Loi du 13 juin
1941, art. 16, [1941] D.A.L. 334 (recordation of accounting statements); art. 17, id. (power
of commission de contr6l to require additional information); art. 18, id. (official publica-
tion of all recorded statements); arts. 19 & 22, id. (civil and penal sanctions for noncompli-
ance or submission of inaccurate information). The idea of requiring notation of security
interests on a business's accounting statements deserves exploration, for most potential
creditors consult their prospective debtor's financial statements, see note 84 supra; account-
ing statements quickly become dated, however, so some additional regulation, as well as
public filing, would seem a necessary corollary. This is the thrust of the French statutes.
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such reasoning is the basis for Article 9's provision for filing as the
notice mechanism for most types of collateral. But the current filing
system might never be able to serve as a single means of notice for
all security interests regardless of the nature of the collateral. The
system is not truly centralized; it is organized by state, and most states
require local (rather than statewide) filing for at least some types
of collateral. A prospective creditor may therefore have to "search"
a number of filing offices-a time-consuming task that, when com-
pleted, may still leave some doubt as to whether every office that
might contain relevant information has been checked. And since fil-
ings generally remain effective for five years, the mechanism seems
unsuited for frequent, short-term transfers between a single creditor
and a variety of debtors, particularly if the transactions would often
implicate filing systems in more than one state.145 This is why, under
the present system, the Ninth Circuit's holding that uncertificated
stock is a general intangible seems at first blush anomalous. But it is
not the notion of filing as to "possessory" collateral that is strange;
after all, filing, even now, is permitted as to chattel paper, which may
include a negotiable instrument, and as to negotiable documents. 146
The idea of filing as to investment securities or other instruments
seems strange only because the current filing system is too clumsy an
animal: at present, it seems unsuited for all types of collateral.
But perhaps present difficulties could be remedied by even mod-
erately creative draftsmen and technicians. Computerization is a re-
ality, and the notion of a nationwide, computerized filing system,
organized by name of debtor rather than type or location of collateral,
is an alluring possibility.' 47 If a lender could almost instantly obtain
145. See note 106 supra.
146. It was natural for the drafters to assume that when tangible or intangible rights
have been embodied in a necessary piece of paper, a security interest or other transfer of
those rights must require a transfer of that piece of paper-that is, perfection through
possession. This, of course, is the general rule for Article 9 instruments (such as stock
certificates or negotiable notes). See p. 1032 S. notes 79 & 80 supra. But the drafters
departed from this thinking in allowing perfection through filing for chattel paper, which
may include a negotiable note-clearly an instrument. Sections 9-105(l)(b), 9-304(1). The
rights of certain future purchasers are protected by §§ 9-108 and 9-109. Thus the idea of
perfection through filing for a necessary piece of paper was introduced by § 9-304(1), not
only as to chattel paper but also as to negotiable documents. Further exceptions to the
rule that transfers of possession are required for necessary pieces of paper are the tem-
porary perfection provisions of §§ 9-304(4), (5) and 9-306(3). And, of course, the role of
possession has been reduced with respect to investment securities by § 8-320, and the
proposed new Article 8 would continue the trend, albeit by adhering to the pattern of
pledge. See pp. 1043-45 supra.
147. The suggestion in the text conjures up the old conflicts-of-law debate over
whether the "situs" of particular things or events or the "domicile" of a party should
control the application of legal rules. For a brief summary, see GILMORE at 599-605.
Interestingly, § 9-103, which states conflicts-of-law rules for perfection of security in-
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from a computer file even the names of his debtor's secured parties,
he would at least be on notice and would be in a position to ask
the right questions of his prospective debtors. Because of its speed
and efficiency, such a system could be used regardless of the nature
of the collateral, even if the nature of the filings and of secured ob-
ligations would require the searcher to proceed further. And if the
requirement of public notice could be so simply satisfied, a number
of problems might be ameliorated. Obvious examples are the com-
plex conflicts-of-law difficulties that result from the ill-correlated no-
tice systems of different states148 and, of course, puzzles such as those
posed by nonexistent yet exclusively pledgeable collateral. It is quite
important to note that the creation of a single system or mechanism
for purposes of public notice would not prevent the formulation of
different rules based on the nature of the collateral in other contexts.
The new personal property security acts of several Canadian prov-
inces are modeled after Article 9 but contemplate central filing with
complete computerization of the filing records. 149 By 1988, the ad-
terests, moved toward a "domiciliary" approach in the 1972 revisions, compare § 9-103(1)
(1962 version) with § 9-103(3)(b) (1972 version), although the current residual rule adheres
to the "situs" idea, see § 9-103(1)(b). For discussions of the Article 9 approach, see GILMORE
at 619-31 (1962 Code); D. VERNON, CONFLICT OF LAws: CASES, PROBLESS AND ESSAYS 5-109
to 5-137 (1973) (1972 Code); Coogan, supra note 99, at 529-58, reprinted in I COOGAN,
HOGAN & VAGTS § 3A.06 (same).
The "domicile" rule, or, as the text suggests, the "name of debtor" rule, has-rather
obviously-greater merit as to intangible or mobile collateral than does the "situs" rule.
For a discussion of the relative merits of the two approaches, see GILMORE at 502-05. As
Professor Gilmore notes, residence (or "domicile") generally "gives a more stable filing
base." Id. at 503. With advanced technology, there may yet be a way to centralize at least
the public notice aspects of the problem.
148. If centralized, nationwide filing were the exclusive means of satisfying the public
notice aspect of "perfection," the horrors of § 9-103, the section that spells out conflicts-of-
law rules to govern "perfection," would diminish significantly, for "domicile" and "situs"
would become irrelevant with respect to public notice. On § 9-103 and its current
problems, see note 147 supra (citing sources). With public notice out of the picture, only
the attachment requirements of § 9-203(l) would be relevant to choice of law, and they
seem much more manageable than the present public notice rules.
Convincing state legislatures to adopt such a proposal might, of course, prove quite
difficult, though it is possible that centralization could be achieved by computerizing and
consolidating (rather than eliminating) individual state filing systems. In any event, "if
the now unconscionable distance between what is the law and what ought to be the law
is to be traveled, the legal profession had better have as its lodestar, not 'political
reality,' but the best and fairest [approach]." Veintraub, Choice of Law in Secured Per-
sonal Property Transactions: The Import of Article 9 of the Uniform Comnmercial Code,
68 Mie. L. REv. 684, 718 (1970).
149. Goode & Gower, Is Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Exportable? An
English Reaction, in AsPECTs OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAw 298, 335 (J. Ziegel & W.
Foster eds. 1969) (footnote omitted): "[Ljocal filing with electronic transmission to a cen-
tral registry . . . is being set up at present in Ontario [,] and it will combine all the
advantages of local and central filing and eliminate most of the problems that have
arisen under the present alternative options allowed by [the United States' Article 9]."
The footnote omitted from the quotation notes that the province of Alberta, which
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vantages and disadvantages of the Canadian system should be evident
enough for future draftsmen to explore my idea in more concrete
fashion than is now possible. Perhaps they will be able to devise a pub-
lic notice system that will be independent of old categories, especial-
ly of the antiquated notion that "possession" has some almost magical
significance. This independence, in any event, should serve as a goal,
even if it cannot be fully implemented and even if the draftsmen reject
computerized filing in favor of some other mechanism, divorced from
"possession," that does actually perform a public notice function.
Conclusion
My suggestion that it may be time to recognize the declining im-
portance and increasing problems of perfection through possession is
impelled by the contrived attempts to "deem" possessory rules ap-
plicable in situations where there is nothing left to possess-for ex-
ample, uncertificated stock and federal book entry securities. The
suggestion grows neither out of a disparaging opinion of Article 9 nor
out of ignorance of the extent to which it has furthered the goals that
its draftsmen set out to accomplish. That forty-nine states now follow
the rules of Article 9 is indisputable and unimpeachable testimony to
its success in transforming true chaos into something approaching uni-
formity.1" 0 There have been failures,1 51 and there are yet omis-
"established a fully centralized registry system in 1966, . .. is now in the process of com-
puterizing it." See The Chattel Security Registries Act, Stat. Alta. 1966, c. 12, as amended
in 1968, Bill 38." See also Caron, L'Article 9 du Code Uniforme de Commerce Peut-Il Attre
Exporte? Point de Vue d'un Juriste Qutbecois, in ASPECTS OF CO.MPAAIuTIVE COMMERCIAL
LAW, supra at 374, 390-91 (Quebec's version of Uniform Personal Property Security Act
contemplates central filing with computerization, to facilitate speedy processing of filing
and search). England may well follow suit. The Crowther Commission, in its report to
Parliament recommending a Proposed Lending and Security Act modeled on Article 9,
emphasized that "the filing system [must] be simple to operate, fast and inexpensive. To
this end the system should use computers." I GREAT BRITAIN DEP'T OF CONSUMER CREDIT,
REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE 220 (1971).
150. The chaotic state of pre-Code chattel security law is well documented in GiLMoRE
at 27, 288-90; see generally id. at 5-286; pp. 1015-16 supra.
151. One of the most serious failures to achieve uniformity has been the provision on
fixtures, § 9-313. Fixtures are hybrids, partly personal property and partly real estate; even
after adoption of § 9-313, their legal definition and treatment varied enormously from
state to state. Any statute providing for chattel security interests in fixtures was bound
to threaten real estate interests in the same property. For discussions of the difficulties
encountered by the 1962 version of § 9-313, see Coogan, Fixtures-Uniformity in Words or
in Fact?, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1186 (1965), reprinted in IA COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS §§ 17.12-
.14; Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 1319 (1962), reprinted in IA COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS §§ 17.01-.11. Section 9-313 was
entirely rewritten during the 1972 revisions and should prove more palatable to real
estate representatives in various state legislatures than did its predecessor. New § 9-313
provides for "fixture filing" in the office in which a real estate mortgage would be
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sions,152 but anyone would have to acknowledge that Article 9 has made
uniform the core of the law with which it deals.153 The parties to a
transaction at least know the relevant questions, even if they cannot al-
ways know of statutory variations or know how a court in a particular
state is likely to answer unless they take local idiosyncracies into ac-
count. This, perhaps, is all that can be expected in a federal system such
as ours.5 4 Even more impressive is Article 9's success in simplifying,
clarifying, and modernizing pre-Code chattel security law, within as
well as among the adopting states.15 5 To the great credit of the drafts-
men, their product has become a model for those seeking to achieve
similar goals in Canada, Great Britain, and non-Anglo-American
jurisdictions. 156
recorded and provides a better tie-in with realty records; this makes it easier for a
potential mortgagee to discover the existence of chattel security interests in property that
is or may become a fixture. In addition, the "construction mortgage" concept of new
§ 9-313(6) gives the mortgagee a means of protecting himself against many secured claims;
it provides that a security interest in fixtures is generally "subordinate to a construction
mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become fixtures before
the completion of the construction." It might be thought that this is undercut to some
extent by § 9-313(4)(c), which subordinates the construction mortgage to a vague category
of chattel security interests in "readily removable . . . machines or . . . replacements of
domestic appliances which are consumer goods" (emphasis added). For discussion of the
new § 9-313, see Coogan, supra note 99, at 483-505, reprinted in 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGIS
§ 3A.02.
152. See note 130 supra (discussing leases).
153. Professor Fairfax Leary once remarked that this was the critical test of the success
of any uniform statute.
154. The pressures of local politics, as well as of special interest groups, and sometimes
disagreements among the draftsmen themselves (often induced by political or other special
influences), make true uniformity a near impossibility in a statute subject to scrutiny and
debate by numerous state legislatures. These factors, for example, are responsible for the
lack of uniformity in § 9-401(l), which specifies where to file and for which three alterna-
tives are available. GILMORE at 517-18. See id. at 524 (footnote omitted):
Our discussion has assumed that the decision between exclusive and double filing
will be made on what may be called its commercial merits. This assumption is to a
degree unrealistic; experience to date suggests that the issue is quite likely to become
entangled in local politics. The town and county clerks are naturally disinclined to
lose the business on which their jobs depend. Their association wil typically insist at
legislative hearings on the maintenance of an exclusively local filing system or, as a
reluctant compromise, on the addition of local to state filing. Anyone who scoffs at
the political influence of the county clerks on state legislatures will in due course
become a sadder but wiser man.
There are other examples as well. Certain of the transactions that § 9-104 excludes from
the requirements of Article 9 were exempted more because of the opposition of pressure
groups than because of any particular logic. One of the more egregious of these, § 9-104(c)
(equipment trusts covering railroad rolling stock), was eliminated in 1972; no one in the
railroad industry was able to give the 1972 draftsmen a convincing reason for continuing
the exemption, which railroad interests in the 1950s had successfully championed. Perhaps
subsections (g) and (1) (exempting transfers of interests in most insurance policies and
deposit accounts) can be likewise eliminated in 1988.
155. Article 9 codified the numerous state laws relating to chattel mortgages, condi-
tional sales, trust receipts, factor's liens, and financing on accounts receivable. See gen-
erally GILMoRE at 5-301; pp. 1015-16 & note 16 supra.
156. See Abel, Is Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code Exportable? The Ontario
Experience, in AsPEcts OF COMPARATIvE COMMERCIAL LAw, supra note 149, at 291, 292
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But a statute cannot rest on its laurels, as Grant Gilmore would
be the first to concede. Indeed, any commercial statute that proposes
"to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices"1 57 in a
rapidly changing commercial world must ever be ready to adapt to
new developments and new needs. I hasten to add that the sponsors
of the U.C.C., far from being oblivious to this fact, have recognized,
perhaps for the first time in the movement for uniform laws, that
commercial law can never remain frozen for any length of time. In
1961, at an early stage after the first states had adopted the U.C.C.,
the sponsors saw the need for a continuing body to pass on suggested
changes; they enlarged the Permanent Editorial Board, making it an
ongoing body with power to suggest changes to the sponsors. The
Board's recent appointment of the 3-4-8 Subcommittee indicates a
continued willingness to explore new problems and to face new chal-
lenges. It is in that spirit that I have endeavored here to unearth some
fundamental issues that may face future draftsmen.158 And it is sin-
gularly fitting that I should undertake such an inquiry in honor of
Grant Gilmore, who will no doubt find my critique of the product
of his labors a truer compliment than any of my words of praise.
(Article 9 was "basic guide" for draftsmen of Canada's Uniform Personal Property Security
Acts); I GmxRT BRITAIN DEP'T OF CONSUMER CREDIT, supra note 149, at 182-230 (describing
proposed Lending and Security Act explicitly modelled on Article 9); BANKING LAWS Cot-
MITrEE (GOVERNMENT OF INDIA), PROJECT STUDY ON PERSONAL PROPERTY SECURITY LAw-
PROJECT REPORT 4-5 (1976) (acknowledging benefit from Article 9's "conceptually com-
prehensive scheme" and noting that Article 9 has served as model for proposed legislation
in Canadian provinces and United Kingdom).
157. Section 1-102(2)(b).
158. It has been nearly four decades since the drafting of the U.C.C. was begun. The
human mind works slowly, and, when changes in accustomed ways of thinking are in-
volved, the collective human mind works at a glacial pace. It is not too early to begin
thinking about 1988 changes.
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